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In October 1822, President Thomas Jefferson urged Justice
William Johnson to take the lead in reinstituting the Jay-Ellsworth
Court's1 practice of issuing seriatim opinions. He extolled the English
preference for documenting each judge's reasoning on the issues before
the Court and deplored its recent abandonment under the influence of
Distinguished Professor of Law Emeritus, University of South Carolina, a former editor
of THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL (1967-77), co-author with George Lee Haskins of
FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-15 (Paul A. Freund ed., 1981), and author of
THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF JOHN MARSHALL (1997).
1. John Jay of New York was the first Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. He
resigned from the Court to assume his duties as governor of New York in 1795. Thereafter John
Rutledge of South Carolina received an interim appointment as Chief Justice, only to be later
refused senatorial confirmation for a permanent appointment; Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut
was appointed in March 1796 and resigned in 1800 while serving as minister to France. This era
of the Court's history has been traditionally known as that of Jay and Ellsworth, the two longest-
serving Chief Justices during the years before 1801. See generally WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE




Lord Mansfield. 2 Justifying his own silent acquiescence in opinions of
the Marshall Court, Johnson pointed to the situation when he joined
the U.S. Supreme Court in 1804. 3 He recalled that "Cushing was
incompetent. Chase could not be got to think or write-Patterson [sic]
was a slow man and willingly declined the trouble, and the other two
judges you know are commonly estimated as one judge."4 Johnson's
biographer Donald Morgan indicates that Justice Johnson was
referring to Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Bushrod Washington
as those Justices understood. to act as one judge. 5 Yet Morgan also
asserts that these two members of the Court, despite their twinning in
the public mind, were in Johnson's view those most entitled to respect
among all of his other colleagues.
6
We need to rethink Justice Johnson's identification of Marshall
and Washington as "one judge," which arose presumably because of
their parallel approaches to law and the Constitution. This analysis is
important for two reasons: (1) Bushrod Washington's record needs to
be reexamined before his habitual silence condemns him to eternal
oblivion as Chief Justice Marshall's shadow, and (2) closer attention to
Justice Washington's activities provides a clearer understanding of
the role a single Justice played within the internal dynamics of the
Marshall Court. The second reason is the most important, for it
elevates our focus beyond merely adding to the hagiography on little-
known Supreme Court Justices. Indeed, it places us in the
mainstream of Court history at a most interesting period of
institutional development. Such scholarly opportunities are too good to
pass up. Despite neglect by academic scholars, each member of the
U.S. Supreme Court is, and always has been, critical to the Court's
2. DONALD G. MORGAN, JUSTICE WILLIAM JOHNSON, THE FIRST DISSENTER: THE CAREER
AND CONSTITUTIONAL PHILOSOPHY OF A JEFFERSONIAN JUDGE 168-69 (1954).
3. Id. at 182.
4. Letter from William Johnson to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 10, 1822), in MORGAN, supra
note 2, at 181-82. Given Johnson's circumstances as the lone Jeffersonian appointee on the
Court from 1804 through 1811, he may be excused for an overly harsh assessment. Both Chase
and Paterson were threatened with impeachment for circuit court trials of Jeffersonian
newspaper publishers; Chase was impeached but narrowly acquitted after a trial before a
Jeffersonian dominated Senate. Herbert A. Johnson, Chief Justice Marshall (1801-1835), 23 J.
SUP. CT. HIST. No. 1, at 3, 9 (1998). Paterson, a shopkeeper's son, unsuccessfully attempted to
maintain his contacts with Princeton classmates, and was a leading contender for elevation to
the Chief Justiceship in 1801. Id. at 9-10. Cushing was elderly, and had declined the Chief
Justiceship nomination in 1795. Id. at 10. But see Scott D. Gerber, Deconstructing William
Cushing, in SERIATIM: THE SUPREME COURT BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL 97, 97-125 (Scott D.
Gerber ed., 1998) [hereinafter SERIATIM] (arguing contrary to general scholarly opinion that
Cushing was a competent and effective member of the Court).




decisionmaking. Indeed, we cannot fully explain the achievements of
the "great Justices" unless we examine the personalities, preferences,
and voting patterns of their lesser-studied colleagues.
I. THE MARSHALL COURT AND ITS JUDICIAL "TWINS"
Charles Hobson has correctly identified John Marshall as "The
Great Chief Justice,"7 but even in the presence of such a powerful
leader, the collegial nature of the Court's work emerges quite clearly.
Marshall was emphatically a "people person," endowed with a
politician's adroitness in achieving consensus and gaining cooperation.
He was also noted for his intelligence and pragmatism.8 The very
process of shaping "Opinions of the Court" demanded that the
separate voices of the other Justices be harmonized into an opinion
acceptable to all or a majority of the bench. As Paul Kahn has
persuasively argued, the institution of the "Opinion of the Court" not
only shielded individual Justices from criticism and concealed their
differences; it also endowed their shared work with an institutional
solidarity and moral authority that were necessarily lacking in a
collection of seriatim opinions.9
A. Small Group Dynamics and the Marshall Court
As an important member of Chief Justice Marshall's closest
circle within the Court, Bushrod Washington is perhaps more
distinguished than many of the Justices highlighted in this
Symposium. Undoubtedly, he was influenced by the small group
dynamics that shaped the Court at this early period of its evolution.
Washington lived in the same Washington, D.C. boardinghouse with
the other Justices, shared meals with them, and frequently engaged in
both formal and informal conferences within the same four walls.
Disagreement would be minimized and perhaps even trivialized with
the Justices living in such proximity to one another. Justice Johnson
7. CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE RULE OF
LAW (William Carey McWilliams & Lance Banning eds., 1996).
8. HOBSON, supra note 7, at 155; Johnson, supra note 4, at 8.
9. Johnson, Marshall, supra note 4, at 8 (commenting on the Court opinion in Sturges V.
Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 207-08 (1819), "[I]s it not in the very nature of opinions
of the Court that, to be collective, they must be the product of compromises worked out in
Conference?"); see also PAUL W. KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW: MARBURY V. MADISON AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA 101-24, 211-19 (1997) (speculating that the opinion of the Court
asserts both the impersonality and the impartiality of the law, and appeared to embody the will
of the people on a given point of law).
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painfully recollected his discomfort when his colleagues discovered
that he planned to issue a separate opinion:
[D]uring the rest of the session I heard nothing but lectures on the indecency of judges
cutting at each other, and the loss of reputation the Virginia appellate court had
sustained by pursuing such a course. At length I found that I must either submit to
circumstances or become such a cipher in our consultations as to effect no good at all. 10
The boardinghouse atmosphere also encouraged close attention
to Court business even during what would otherwise be leisure hours.
Toward the end of Marshall's Chief Justiceship, when the collegial
residence of the Court in a single boardinghouse was beginning to
unravel, Justice Joseph Story decided that he would bring his wife
with him to Washington for Court sessions and that she would stay
with the Justices in their boardinghouse. 1 While the Chief Justice
was gracious enough to extend a chivalrous welcome to Sarah Story,
she apparently took Marshall's hint that her presence might distract
her husband from his work. Sarah Story never again returned to
Washington for the Court's sessions.
1 2
Despite the sheltered refuge of the boardinghouse, the Justices
were painfully aware of their isolation from Washington society
during the presidency of Thomas Jefferson and the first years of the
Madison Administration. As researchers have noted, ostracism and
pressure from external forces tend to increase the bonds of connection
among group members. 13 Furthermore, small groups under such
pressure tend to instill self-discipline on group members to create
conformity and to encourage behavior acceptable by group
standards. 14 Social ostracism was somewhat relieved, however, after
Justice Thomas Todd courted and wed Dolly Madison's niece, Lucy
Payne, and it virtually disappeared after James Monroe, a boyhood
10. MORGAN, supra note 2, at 182.
11. Johnson, supra note 4, at 15-16.
12. Id. at 16; see also G. EDWARD WHITE, 3-4 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-35, at 189, 193 (Paul A.
Freund & Stanley N. Katz eds., 1988) (observing that the boardinghouse provided a fraternal
setting not conducive to dissent, and that in 1829, the year of Justice Washington's death, the
boardinghouse arrangement was well into decline).
13. PETER M. BLAU, EXCHANGE AND POWER IN SOCIAL LIFE 170, 198, 295 (1964); see also
ELTON T. REEVES, THE DYNAMICS OF GROUP BEHAVIOR 129-30 (1970) (asserting that this
cohesion can enhance creative and innovative activity within the group). An expansive discussion
of the Marshall Court and modern social psychology appears in Robert G. Seddig, John Marshall
and the Origins of Supreme Court Leadership, 36 U. PITT. L. REV. 785, 788-92 (1978).
14. Muzafer Sharif, Introductory Statement, in INTERGROUP RELATIONS AND LEADERSHIP:
APPROACHES AND RESEARCH IN INDUSTRIAL, ETHNIC, CULTURAL AND POLITICAL AREAS 19
(Muzafer Sharif ed., 1962). For Justice Johnson's experience in this regard, see MORGAN, supra
note 2 (describing Justice Johnson's discomfort when his colleagues discovered that he planned
to issue a separate opinion).
450 [Vol. 62:2:447
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classmate of the Chief Justice, became President in 1817.15 On the
other hand, political and judicial reform pressures continued to harass
the Court until and beyond Bushrod Washington's death in 1829.
Generated by strenuous state and congressional efforts to limit the
Supreme Court's federal question jurisdiction and to expand states'
rights through ambiguities in the Eleventh Amendment, the
possibility of reprisals was an ever-present factor in the thoughts and
behavior of all the Justices.
16
B. A Tale of Two Justices
Against this background the long and deep friendship between
Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Bushrod Washington was forged.
General George Washington's nephew and heir began his Supreme
Court service in the more tranquil days of the Jay-Ellsworth Court,
when all of the Justices were appointees of the Federalists. 17 At that
point in the Court's development, relatively few cases moved through
the state and federal court systems, and the high Court lacked a
significant appellate caseload. The Jeffersonian sweep of the 1800
elections dramatically altered the political and power relationships
among the three branches of government, however, and thrust an
elderly-and Federalist-appointed-Supreme Court into the
unenviable position of confronting the other two branches of
government and defending the constitutional vision of a disintegrating
Federalist party.18 When John Marshall became Chief Justice in
January 1801, Justice Washington was the youngest Justice on the
Court and was senior in service only to Justice Alfred Moore of North
Carolina, who would resign from the Court in 1804.19 Freshman
Congressman Joseph Story met Justice Washington in 1808 and
indicated that, while the Justice was mild and unassuming in
demeanor, he was highly esteemed as a profound lawyer.20 Two
decades later, after Justice Washington's death, Story was more
precise in his analysis:
[H]is mind was solid, rather than brilliant, sagacious and searching, rather than quick
and eager; slow but not torpid; steady, but not unyielding; comprehensive, but at the
15. Johnson, supra note 4, at 14-16.
16. HOBSON, supra note 7, at 127-32; HERBERT A. JOHNSON, THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF
JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-1835, at 71-72, 77, 79, 83-84 (1997).
17. JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 22-23.
18. Id. at 30-32.
19. Id. at 22-23.
20. JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 23-24.
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same time cautious .... He was, by original temperament, mild, conciliating and
candid, and yet he was remarkable for an uncompromising firmness.
2 1
Quite by chance, Chief Justice Marshall was partially
responsible for Washington's nomination to the Supreme Court. The
two had been summoned to Mount Vernon by General Washington,
who persuaded both men to run as Federalist candidates for
congressional seats in Virginia.22 When Associate Justice James
Wilson died before the campaign had begun, President John Adams
offered the seat to Marshall, who declined but suggested that if
Washington was nominated he would probably accept. 23 Marshall's
recommendation was based upon a long personal and professional
acquaintance with Washington.24 Together they attended George
Wythe's 1780 law lectures at the College of William and Mary, and
both were members of Phi Beta Kappa. When Marshall went on to
begin a country law practice in Fauquier County, Virginia,
Washington moved to Philadelphia to continue his legal studies with
James Wilson, who would later become one of the original Justices of
the Supreme Court. Marshall and Washington's careers crossed again
when, after 1783, both began to build reputations as fellow members
of the Richmond appellate bar.25 This was a specialized group of
counsel who appeared in Virginia's superior courts, and Bushrod
Washington was the reporter of a two-volume set of reports on cases
decided in the Virginia Court of Appeals, which was the highest court
of law and equity in the Old Dominion.26 After Washington's 1798
appointment to the Supreme Court, Marshall was elected to Congress,
where he was honored with the responsibility of memorializing George
21. Id. at 24. Story's catalog of his colleague's strengths and weaknesses would seem to
emphasize many virtues that Story himself lacked, but which he apparently both appreciated
and viewed as behavior he would like to emulate.
22. Id. at 22.
23. GEORGE L. HASKINS & HERBERT A. JOHNSON, 2 THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT, FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL 1801-15, at 97 (Paul A. Freund ed.,
1981); JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 22; 3 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 507-08 (Charles F.
Hobson et al. eds., 1974-2006) [hereinafter MARSHALL PAPERS]. Additional details concerning
Washington's nomination and service on the Court are at WHITE, supra note 12, at 345-47.
24. JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 23.
25. Id. at 22-23.
26. 5 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 23, at 4, 454, 457. Marshall and Bushrod Washington
were associated as co-counsel in several cases and they had also served together on a legislative
law revision committee in 1796. 2 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 23, at 89, 160, 282-89, 319,
481; 12 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 23, at 578; see also James R. Stoner, Jr., Heir Apparent:
Bushrod Washington and Federal Justice in the Early Republic, in SERIATIM, supra note 4, at
324, 327 (describing Washington's reports of Virginia Court of Appeals cases to be "a pioneering
effort when there were no official court reports or systematic written opinions").
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Washington in a eulogy delivered before the House of Representatives
in 1799.27
Shortly after Marshall assumed his duties as Chief Justice, he
and Washington worked together to prepare Marshall's five volume
Life of George Washington.28 Although the Chief Justice was clearly
the author of the biography, Bushrod Washington's role was far more
involved than simply supplying materials as the executor of his uncle's
estate. Their collaboration seems to have begun in March 1802, when
General Washington's papers were delivered to the Chief Justice.
Though neither Justice wanted his association with the project to
become widely known, the Chief Justice felt free to write General
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, a South Carolina Federalist leader, to
recruit his assistance in describing the southern campaigns of the
Revolution.29 Unfortunately, the correspondence between Marshall
and Washington is far from complete, but it is apparent from the
surviving manuscripts that Washington's presence in Philadelphia
facilitated contact with the publisher, Caleb P. Wayne. The two
Justices shared the task of proofreading and indexing each of the
volumes, and while Washington usually was asked to convey
Marshall's wishes to Wayne, there were occasions when Marshall
authorized Washington to make independent decisions concerning the
text.30 In January 1804, Marshall finally agreed to Wayne and
Washington's urging that his name appear as author of The Life of
George Washington, but he persisted in his determination that his
official position as Chief Justice not be indicated on the title page of
27. JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 23.
28. The project had been discussed before Marshall's nomination to be Chief Justice and
while he was secretary of state. Letter from Caleb P. Wayne to John Marshall (Oct. 3, 1800), in 4
MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 23, at 314. The first publication of this work was 1-5 JOHN
MARSHALL, THE LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON (Caleb P. Wayne 1804-1807); a second edition,
issued under the same title, was published in 1833, but in a two volume format, by J. Crissy of
Philadelphia. An extensive introductory comment on colonial history, first published in the
1804-1807 edition, had been republished as JOHN MARSHALL, A HISTORY OF THE COLONIES
PLANTED BY THE ENGLISH ON THE CONTINENT OF NORTH AMERICA (Abraham Small 1824). The
first edition appeared in several foreign language editions, and the second edition was reprinted
frequently in the nineteenth century, presumably as a school textbook.
29. 6 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 23, at 124. It seems likely that both were inclined
toward anonymity for two reasons. The first would be a desire to avoid politically motivated
attacks on the biography and rekindle partisan conflicts that marked the end of George
Washington's Administration. The second would be the risk of involving the Supreme Court in
controversy through an extra-judicial publication.
30. Id. at 274-75, 294 n.1, 306, 320. In July 1804, Wayne informed Marshall that
Washington had permitted Wayne to give a copy of the volume three manuscript to Charles
Chauncy, with a view toward getting the information Marshall needed. Id. at 305.
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the volumes.3 1 Six months later, Marshall advised Wayne that he
could not break the seals on the box containing materials on the
''conspiracy against General Washington" because Justice Washington
did not wish him to do so. 32 However, he did write to Washington to
gain permission to examine the manuscripts.
33
Publication of the first edition of The Life of George Washington
did not terminate Marshall and Washington's shared labors.
Marshall's discontent with the accuracy of the first edition impelled
him to remedy those errors; at the same time, Caleb Wayne refused to
publish a new edition unless it was sharply abridged. 34 During these
1821 negotiations, Marshall and Washington began work on an
edition of General Washington's correspondence, a project that was
most reluctantly but prudently abandoned to Jared Sparks, the
historian and editor of several other statesmen's papers.
35
Justice Washington's close collaboration with the Chief Justice
also extended to the work of the Supreme Court. When Marshall was
faced with admiralty issues in his assigned circuit courts, 36 he wrote to
Washington for advice.37 Similarly, he sought his fellow Virginian's
advice on complex issues in negotiable instruments law.
38
Washington's duties in the U.S. Circuit Courts for New Jersey and
Pennsylvania had involved him in a large number of maritime and
31. Letter from John Marshall to Caleb P. Wayne (Jan. 10, 1804), in 6 MARSHALL PAPERS,
supra note 23, at 250.
32. Letter from John Marshall to Caleb P. Wayne (July 3, 1804), in 6 MARSHALL PAPERS,
supra note 23, at 299.
33. Id. The interchange of letters would suggest that, in accordance with the existing
scholarly practices, materials dealing with a deceased biographee's life were not examined
without the permission of his family, and that the practice was followed in regard to Marshall's
THE LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON.
34. Letter from John Marshall to Bushrod Washington (Dec. 27, 1821), in 9 MARSHALL
PAPERS, supra note 23, at 195-96.
35. Letters from John Marshall to Bushrod Washington (July 6, 1821, Dec. 27, 1821, May
28, 1823, June 25, 1823, Apr. 19, 1825), in 9 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 23, at 195-96, 238,
322, 328-29; Letter from John Marshall to Bushrod Washington (Apr. 9, 1825), 10 MARSHALL
PAPERS, supra note 23, at 170; Letter from John Marshall to Jared Sparks (Mar. 16, 1826), 10
MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 23, at 276-77. A recent short article casts additional light upon
the Sparks's edition of George Washington's papers, and Chief Justice Marshall's role in bringing
that project to fruition. Jude M. Pfister, Jared Sparks and Justices Washington, Marshall and
Story, Q. NEWSL. SUP. CT. HIST. SOC., July 2008, at 9-11.
36. Until 1892 Supreme Court Justices were expected to hold circuit courts for the trial of
federal cases; during his term as Chief Justice, John Marshall assigned himself the circuit courts
held in Virginia and North Carolina. JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 112-13, 116.
37. Letter from John Marshall to Bushrod Washington (May 25, 1813), in 7 MARSHALL
PAPERS, supra note 23, at 390.
38. Letter from John Marshall to Bushrod Washington (May 31, 1813), in 8 MARSHALL
PAPERS, supra note 23, at 315.
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commercial law cases.3 9 In exchange, when in 1823 Washington was
completing his editorial work as reporter of the second volume of
Virginia Court of Appeals cases, Marshall made two visits to the
Virginia Chancery Court's record office to verify in the original
manuscripts the accuracy of a 1792 published report.
40
Paramount among Justice Washington's activities supporting
the Chief Justice was his role in arranging the pseudonymous
publication of Marshall's "Friend of the Union" and "Friend of the
Constitution" essays. Written to defend the Court's 1819 decision in
McCulloch v. Maryland4' against the attacks by "Amphictyon" (Judge
William Brockenbrough) and "Hampden" (Judge Spencer Roane)
published in the pro-Jeffersonian Richmond Enquirer, Marshall's
essays were published in the Alexandria Gazette.42 To protect his
anonymity in this extraordinary effort to shield the Court from states'
rights criticism, Marshall forwarded the manuscripts to Washington
for placement with the Alexandria newspaper. 43 He also cautioned
Washington not to send correspondence or copies of the essays directly
to him, lest they fall into hostile hands or create a suspicion that he
was the author.44 To the chagrin of both men, the Alexandria printer
garbled the text of Marshall's essays, and the correct version did not
appear in print until they were reprinted in 1969 under the editorship
of Gerald Gunther. 45 Drafting the essays was an extraordinary
departure from judicial decorum, but even more striking is the degree
to which Marshall trusted his reputation to the loyalty and discretion
of Bushrod Washington. 46 The relationship unquestionably was
39. Id.; Letter from John Marshall to Bushrod Washington (May 31, 1814), in 8 MARSHALL
PAPERS, supra note 23, at 315; Letter from John Marshall to Bushrod Washington (July 13,
1821), in 9 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 23, at 180.
40. Letters from John Marshall to Bushrod Washington (Apr. 15, 1822, June 17, 1822), in 9
MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 23, at 201, 237-38.
41. The case brought before the Court the constitutionality of a Maryland statute taxing the
notes issued by the Bank of the United States. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 400 (1819). Marshall's
opinion for the Court upholding Congress's chartering of the Bank relied upon powers to be
implied from the Constitution, and a broad interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Id. at 406-24. It also established the primacy of federal action under the Supremacy Clause
when the federal actions are duly authorized by the Constitution. Id. Thus, the Court ruled that
the notes issued by the Bank of the United States might not be taxed by a state. Id. at 437.
42. 8 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 23, at 282.
43. Id. at 282-83.
44. Both the logic and the rhetoric of the interchange is thoroughly, but briefly, discussed in
WHITE, supra note 12, at 552-67; see also 8 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 23, at 282-87, 317
(providing the text of Marshall's essays).
45. GERALD GUNTHER, JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 52-77
(Gerald Gunther ed., 1969).
46. JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 24.
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extremely close, even among a group of Supreme Court Justices who
seem to have worked very closely together.
To demonstrate the cooperative and supportive behavior of
Marshall Court Justices toward each other, Professor White points to
the fact that Justices Washington and Story exchanged "semiannual
reports" concerning the most interesting cases tried in their respective
circuit courts. He further speculates that this practice may have been
widespread among Marshall Court Justices. White proposes that
a group of justices on the Marshall Court-Story, Washington, and Marshall were
conspicuous among them, with perhaps the less active support of Todd and Livingston-
were [sic] self-consciously interested in shaping federal law, expanding federal
jurisdiction, and creating opportunities to do so. The correspondence about circuit
decisions would then serve as a vehicle for fulfilling such goals.
4 7
Close control over the major issues presented at the circuit level
undoubtedly dovetailed with the Supreme Court's use of the certificate
of division procedure initiated by the Judiciary Act of 1802. When the
Supreme Court Justice assigned to the circuit disagreed with the
district court judge sitting with him, they could certify the question to
the Supreme Court en banc, thus resolving a troublesome issue of law
arising in the circuit. 48 Indeed, given the possibility of an extended
interchange of "semiannual reports" among the Justices, the
certificate of division opportunity might also have facilitated early
determination of conflicts between and within the circuits.
49
The exchange of professional information concerning circuit
cases also strikingly parallels the personal friendships among
Marshall Court Justices. The Chief Justice was so close to Story and
Washington that his letters to them closed with the word
"affectionately."50 Scholars have commented on the close relationship
among the three, and, interestingly, when Justice Washington was ill
during 1821, a contingent of Supreme Court Justices-Story, Todd,
and Livingston-made the trip to Mount Vernon to visit him. 51
47. WHITE, supra note 12, at 349.
48. Id. at 173-74.
49. Id.; HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 628.
50. E.g., Letter from John Marshall to Bushrod Washington (July 12, 1823), in 9 MARSHALL
PAPERS, supra note 23, at 332-34.
51. JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 24, 36, 37; 2 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 23, at 316
(involving Marshall witnessing a deed conveying title to "Belvidere" to Washington); 3
MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 23, at 493-94 (reprinting Washington's address to citizens of
Albemarle, on Marshall's return from the XYZ Mission); Letter from John Marshall to George C.
Washington (Nov. 29, 1829), in 11 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 23, at 285 (quoting Marshall on
death of Washington: "I had few friends who I valued so highly as your Uncle, or whose loss I
should regret more sincerely .... We have been most intimate of friends for more than forty
years, and never has our friendship sustained the slightest interruption."); see also Stoner, supra
note 26, at 323 (quoting the eulogy of Washington by Story, "a tenderness of giving offense, and
456 [Vol. 62:2:447
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Unquestionably, Justice Washington was a member of the inner circle
of the Marshall Court. This was a group that provided both personal
and judicial support to the Chief Justice, and it was also a cadre that
discouraged dissent and the expression of individualistic opinions. Its
influence and example provided additional support for Marshall's
positions, and Washington's personality and friendship may well have
drawn Justices Todd and Livingston into a larger group of the Chief
Justice's supporters.
II. BUSHROD WASHINGTON ON THE SUPREME COURT
A decade ago James Stoner made the astute observation that
Justice Washington was an interesting transitional figure between the
Jay-Ellsworth Court and its successor, the Marshall Court. 52 Because
Washington left few papers behind and secondary works on the
Justice are few, no scholar has yet taken up the challenge of analyzing
this aspect of Washington's career. Certainly, it is not too speculative
to suggest that Washington's low profile on the Marshall Court is due
in part to his brief tenure on the earlier tribunal. The Ellsworth Court
had been deeply troubled by its experiences in the years before
Marshall's appointment in 1801. Its major constitutional decision in
Chisholm v. Georgia, upholding the original jurisdiction of the U.S.
Supreme Court over a debt collection action brought against the State
of Georgia by a citizen of South Carolina, was promptly overruled by a
constitutional amendment ratified less than two years later.53 In the
interim, Chief Justice John Jay was on an extended leave of absence
in England where he was negotiating the Anglo-American treaty that
bears his name. On Jay's return in 1795, he resigned from his
leadership position on the Court to be elected governor of New York.
54
After William Cushing refused the nomination for Chief Justice and
John Rutledge was denied confirmation by the Senate, Oliver
Ellsworth of Connecticut served as Chief Justice for five years, two of
yet a fearlessness of consequences, in his official character .... a rare combination, which added
much to the dignity of the bench, and made justice itself, even when most severe, soften into the
moderation of mercy").
52. Stoner, supra note 26, at 323; see also WHITE, supra note 12, at 350-51 (noting Justice
Washington's easing the transition to the changes made by Marshall and leading the other
Justices into the "opinion of the Court" through his own example).
53. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), superseded by U.S. CONST. amend XI. The Court's decision
was reversed by the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment on February 7, 1795. See generally
WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIPS OF
JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH, 188-203 (Herbert A. Johnson ed., 1995) (describing the case
and its subsequent history).
54. CASTO, supra note 53, at 87-90.
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which coincided with his service as a U.S. minister to the French
Republic. 55 To make matters worse, the Supreme Court Justices' role
on the circuit, trying prosecutions against leaders of the Fries uprising
and the Whiskey Rebellion, aroused resentment toward the individual
Justices and the Court as an institution. Bushrod Washington shared
with his brethren the opprobrium associated with later trials of
Jeffersonian-Republican newspaper editors convicted under the
Sedition Act of 1798.56 Fortunately for him, his innate sense of
humility and kindness dissuaded him from behaving in an excessively
harsh manner toward counsel and defendants in Sedition Act trials;
even so, he may have witnessed the 1804 and 1805 impeachment and
trial of Justice Samuel Chase with more than casual and disinterested
attention.
57
Joining the Supreme Court in 1798, Washington became heir
to the growing docket of admiralty cases pending in the federal circuit
courts and awaiting appeal to the Supreme Court.58 While most of this
litigation involved prize cases, it also provided the former Richmond
lawyer with more familiarity with maritime law, international and
foreign law, and the reasoning and procedures of civilian and
continental jurisprudence. With this new knowledge, Washington
became one of the Marshall Court's experts in these areas, which
would serve him well after his 1802 assignment to the newly
established federal circuit for Pennsylvania and New Jersey, where
maritime law and international matters would occupy much of his
time as Circuit Justice. 59
A. Bushrod Washington as Senior Associate Justice
From 1811 until his death in 1829, Washington was the Senior
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. His early accession to the
second most senior position on the Court was as abrupt as it was
inevitable, given the advanced age of his colleagues. 60 William
55. Id. at 118-19, 124.
56. See generally JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION
LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 159-87 (1956).
57. Although Bushrod Washington fully supported the enactment of the Alien and Sedition
Acts, as a circuit justice he imposed moderate sentences on the newspaper editors involved in the
five trials he conducted. In addition, his actions were seen to moderate prosecutorial zeal. Stoner,
supra note 26, at 330-32.
58. JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 118-19.
59. Washington's contributions as a circuit justice are discussed at length beginning at
infra Part III.
60. See Irving Dillard, Samuel Chase, in 1 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 121, 134 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds.,
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Cushing of Massachusetts, one of President Washington's first
appointees, died on September 13, 1810; nine months later Samuel
Chase, riddled with gout, died at his home in Maryland. 61 Given the
delicate health of both Justices prior to their deaths, it is quite
probable that Bushrod Washington already had some experience
presiding over the Court in the absence of Chief Justice Marshall and
his more senior colleagues.
Strong circumstantial evidence suggests that seniority in the
early Marshall Court, at least until the War of 1812, determined who
delivered the opinions for the Court. In most cases it was the Chief
Justice himself.62 There is also a serious likelihood that the delivering
Justice also wrote the opinion. After 1815 the seniority rule shifted to
something more closely approximating its modern usage: the senior
Justice representing either the majority or the minority would write
and deliver the opinion or designate a colleague to write and deliver
the opinion. 63 The statistics indicate that after 1820 Justices
Washington, Story, Thompson, and Johnson shared in the delivery of
the Court's opinions-a role that Washington seems to have assumed
as early as 1809.64 We may therefore speculate whether Justice
Washington, given some of his jurisprudential positions to be
discussed supra, became a mediating influence between the Chief
Justice and his fellow associates. This conciliating function, coupled
with Washington's seniority, could have moved him into a critically
important role in the Marshall Court after 1815. Many issues
polarized the Court during and after the War of 1812, but the complex
questions of bankruptcy regulation constitute perhaps the best
introduction both to Justice Washington's jurisprudence and to his
differences from his friend, Chief Justice Marshall.
B. The Bankruptcy Clause
The 1819 Term of the Supreme Court was marked by
noteworthy progress toward strengthening the federal government's
constitutional role within the American republic. McCulloch v.
Chelsea House Publishers, 3d ed. 1997) [hereinafter THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT] (Justice Chase died in 1811); Herbert A. Johnson, William Cushing, in 1 THE
JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, supra, at 40, 54 (Justice Cushing died in
1810).
61. Dillard, supra note 60, at 134; Johnson, supra note 60, at 54.
62. JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 87-92.
63. HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 383-89; see also JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 87-
92, 100-02 (examining the seniority phenomenon through the entire Marshall Chief Justiceship).
64. See JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 88-89 (presenting a chart providing the number of
opinions annually of the Court by Justices from 1801 to 1835).
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Maryland clarified the nature of federal supremacy, adopted a broad
definition of the Necessary and Proper Clause, and began the task of
delineating state and federal taxing powers. 65 Dartmouth College v.
Woodward66 continued the expansion of the Contracts Clause that had
begun in Fletcher v. Peck67 by including private corporate charters
within the ambit of federal constitutional protection against state
impairments of the obligations of contract. 68 However-and it was a
big "however"-the bankruptcy cases 69 threatened to destroy the
unanimity and magnanimity of the high Court. A deft and generally
unsatisfactory compromise postponed the Court's public
embarrassments until 1827;70 in the intervening seven years,
Congress remained mired in the political quagmire of bankruptcy
relief,71 leaving the Court to its own devices and failing to enact a
uniform law of bankruptcy, as authorized by the Constitution.
Sturges v. Crowninshield and Ogden v. Saunders bracket this
important turning point in Supreme Court history. Economic distress
in 1818 and 1819 focused public attention on the need for a
nationwide bankruptcy provision or, failing that, the establishment of
effective, state-based systems designed to relieve the financial
difficulties of insolvent debtors. The public, in its desire for economic
well-being, clamored for relief, regardless of whether the instrument
of change was the Supreme Court, Congress, or the state
legislatures. 72 Professor White stresses the unique nature of the
public's reaction to the 1819 decision in Sturges:
65. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
66. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 519 (1819).
67. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
68. Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. at 682-715.
69. The main opinion is Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819), coupled
with a related case McMillan v. McNeill, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 209 (1819).
70. The sharp differences of opinion in the Sturges case are exposed in Justice William
Johnson's seriatim opinion joining with the majority in Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.)
213, 272-73 (1819).
71. Some of the legislative and policy difficulties are explored in PETER J. COLEMAN,
DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA: INSOLVENCY, IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT, AND BANKRUPTCY,
1607-1900, at 271-86 (1974); see also WHITE, supra note 12, at 628-33, 636-37, 648 (referring to
legislative debtor relief efforts, and suggesting that a marked change in the concept of property
rights had occurred during these years). Congress's two efforts at enacting a federal bankruptcy
law were short-lived. The Act of April 4, 1800 was repealed on December 19, 1803, and the Act of
August 19, 1841 was repealed on March 3, 1843. Herbert A. Johnson, Federal Union, Property,
and the Contract Clause: John Marshall's Thought in Light of Sturges v. Crowninshield and
Ogden v. Saunders, in JOHN MARSHALL'S ACHIEVEMENT: LAW, POLITICS, AND CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATIONS 33, 53 n.27 (Thomas C. Shevory ed., 1989).
72. MORGAN, supra note 2, at 117.
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With Sturges a new direction of the commentary surfaced, the sense that the Supreme
Court of the United States could have a direct effect on the affairs of citizens of every
part of the nation. Sturges had come at a time when. .. American commerce had taken
on an expansionist and increasingly interstate character, and in which the principle of
negotiability had emerged from a localistic, two party setting to become a major
mechanism of exchange.
The two cases also frame a period of rapid personnel change
within the Court. The deaths of Marshall's valued colleagues
Brockholst Livingston and Thomas Todd brought novel constitutional
positions from newcomers Smith Thompson and Robert Trimble. 73 The
intervening years also altered the preferences and positions among
the veteran Justices who participated in Ogden.74 It was in Ogden that
these differences first became public, and the seriatim opinions
highlighted a sharp confrontation between Bushrod Washington and
the Chief Justice over the Contracts Clause's impact on state
bankruptcy laws.75 Despite Marshall's strong dissent in Ogden, the
majority opinions left no doubt that thereafter the Contracts Clause
would have a limited application for the first time in American
constitutional history.76 Had Marshall's position prevailed, it is
possible that no state or federal debtor relief laws involving the
discharge of obligations would have been constitutional. 77 Marshall
and Washington found themselves on a collision course on the
construction of the Contracts Clause, and neither was willing to defer
to the other. As Charles Hobson observes about the Chief Justice,
rather than taking the easier course of quietly acquiescing, Marshall
strenuously dissented from the majority opinions. The fact "that he
refused to [agree silently] ... underscored his conviction that the
Contract Clause, or rather the principle it embodied, contained the
vital essence of the Constitution."
78
In the evolution of constitutional law by the Marshall Court,
Sturges and Ogden are perhaps best remembered as two decisions
that halted the previously rapid broadening of the Contracts Clause.
79
However, in the process of deciding these cases, a number of complex
but related issues also emerged. First and most obvious was the
73. WHITE, supra note 12, at 304-05.
74. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED
YEARS, 1789-1888, at 156 (1985); WHITE, supra note 12, at 305 (finding Ogden v. Saunders a
turning point and the first time the Court sustained a state bankruptcy or insolvency law).
75. CURRIE, supra note 74, at 128.
76. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 213 (1827).
77. CURRIE, supra note 74, at 156; WHITE, supra note 12, at 305.




nature of Congress's bankruptcy power under the Constitution.80 Was
it an exclusive power, given that Congress was authorized to enact a
"uniform" bankruptcy law? Or was it concurrent, given the historical
record of insolvency and state debtor relief laws antecedent to
ratification? Lurking in these questions was the fact that the
Constitution did not expressly deny to states the power to enact
bankruptcy laws. Additionally, there was the difficulty of conforming
state bankruptcy provisions to the Contracts Clause's mandate that
states not impair the obligation of contracts.81 Did that require
bankruptcy legislation to be prospective in operation? Further, once
enacted, did the right to bankruptcy relief become a constitutionally
guaranteed part of contracts even if the state subsequently repealed
the law or enacted a substitute? This was as much a question of public
law concerning the authority and capability of state legislatures as it
was an issue of private rights against governmental action. And in
1819, there was a desperate need for some effective relief from one
level of the government or the other as the nation slipped into the grip
of the worst depression it had seen since its creation.
A final question was whether the protections of the Contracts
Clause extended to guaranteeing remedies for breach, or if a valid
distinction could be drawn between the "obligations" of contract, which
would receive protection, and mere "remedies," which would not.8 2
More specifically, was release from debtors' prison an interference
with the obligation of a contract? Arguably, the coercive impact of
imprisonment was a powerful incentive to perform a contract and may
well have been one of the inducements for the creditor to enter into a
contractual arrangement with the party who became delinquent.
Arguably, such a remedy had an importance beyond mere procedural
considerations, and thus was an integral part of the obligation of a
contract. As such a significant aspect of the contracting process, the
availability of debt imprisonment may well have been considered one
of those obligations of a debtor that was to be protected under the
Contracts Clause. More remotely, did retrospective usury laws that
could not be anticipated by the contracting parties, or statutes of
limitation that reduced a creditor's opportunity to sue on a preexisting
contract, also so impair a critical element in the contract that they too
were protected by the Contracts Clause?
Complicating these factors were difficulties of classifying
contracts for conflicts of law determinations and identifying which
80. Ogden, 25 U.S. at 264; Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 193 (1819).
81. Ogden, 25 U.S. at 264; Sturges, 17 U.S. at 193.
82. Ogden, 25 U.S. at 259-60; Sturges, 17 U.S. at 199.
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state statutes were applicable and which courts could exercise
jurisdiction. While the place of contracting usually determined the
applicable law, parties to the contract might have moved their
businesses to another state, designated another state as the place of
performance, or stipulated in their agreement that the law of a state
other than the place of contracting would apply. There was concern
that state statutes would not be given an extraterritorial operation or
that courts exercising jurisdiction might not be the appropriate
tribunals to determine cases. These considerations comprised a fourth
factor grouped within an umbrella category of "federal concerns." In
addition, there was a question dating to colonial times: Was a
discharge by the courts of one state a sufficient bar to a subsequent
collection action brought in a sister state or colony?
8 3
Finally, the Bankruptcy Clause problem raised issues that
more recent constitutional theory would deem "dormancy" questions
and preemption concerns.8 4 When Sturges and Ogden came before the
Supreme Court, there was no federal bankruptcy statute. Yet for a
brief period from 1800 through 1803, there had been such a statute.8 5
Did the subsequent repeal of the statute indicate congressional intent
to enter the field? If not, did its repeal signify a willingness to allow
state legislation to substitute for a federal enactment? Indeed, the
1800 statute had included a provision incorporating previously
enacted state laws not in conflict with its provisions.86 The Chief
Justice in his 1824 opinion for the Court in Gibbons v. Ogden adroitly
avoided dealing with the dormancy of the commerce power.8 7 Thus,
when Ogden v. Saunders was decided in 1827, it was still a matter of
conjecture whether the Constitution's grant of federal power in these
vital economic areas precluded the states from legislating when
Congress had not acted, or, in the case of the bankruptcy power, had
83. HERBERT A. JOHNSON, JOHN JAY: COLONIAL LAWYER 118-19 (2006). Although both state
bankruptcy statutes and debt relief under insolvency laws tended to be treated as in rem
proceedings, as such they would not be binding beyond the jurisdiction. On the other hand, if an
out of state creditor had actually appeared in the proceeding, in personam rules would preclude a
subsequent action in another state.
84. Johnson, supra note 71, at 48.
85. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, 1 Stat. 19 (repealed 1803).
86. Id. ch. 19, § 61. State insolvency or bankruptcy proceedings below the jurisdiction
amounts established by the Bankruptcy Act, or which were not "clearly within the purview of
this act," were to continue despite the enactment of the Bankruptcy Act. Id. In addition, in the
case of an imprisoned debtor who after three months had not been proceeded against under the
Bankruptcy Act, the debtor was to be given relief available to him or her under the insolvent
debtor statutes. Id. In addition, state real property liens existing prior to the enactment of the
Bankruptcy Act were not affected by the federal statute. Id. § 63.
87. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 76 (1824).
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withdrawn from acting.88 However, the majority opinions in Ogden
accepted what might be considered a concurrency interpretation,
permitting state legislation to operate until such time as Congress
should act, or unless there was a clear conflict that violated the
Supremacy Clause.
The Justices typically avoided asking questions for which they
could not provide an answer or did not wish to answer. Drafted by a
committee to which Marshall as a congressman had belonged, the
1800 Bankruptcy Act was a major piece of legislation that endeavored
to provide a detailed foundation for the exercise of the uniform
bankruptcy power authorized by the Constitution.8 9 Given the strong
Jeffersonian opposition to the 1800 legislation, 90 it is not surprising
that it was repealed in 1803. On the other hand, the fact that
Congress had legislated so carefully would suggest a congressional
intent to occupy the field, and perhaps a wish to preclude parallel
state legislation.91 From 1803 to 1827, there were sporadic efforts to
enact a replacement federal bankruptcy statute, and the failure to do
so presented the Supreme Court with a problem of statesmanship:
Could states not act in regards to insolvency and to discharge debtors
88. Marshall's opinion for the Court in Gibbons v. Ogden adroitly avoided a holding that the
commerce power was exclusive, and the 1827 opinions in Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.)
213, 254, 271 (1827) seem to have manifested a further step toward concurrence between federal
and state powers. Johnson, supra note 71, at 48.
89. On Marshall's participation in this legislative drafting, see 4 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra
note 23, at 34, 38, 52; see also Johnson, supra note 71, at 35-36 (describing not only this
legislative activity, but also Marshall's personal and professional experience with insolvent
debtors).
90. See CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 16 (1935) (describing
Jefferson's objections to a national bankruptcy system as an attempt to protect land from
creditors).
91. This aspect of constitutional law has come to be known as the preemption doctrine. See,
e.g., 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1172 (3d ed. 2000) (describing the
preemption doctrine). Preemption arises when state legislation comes into apparent conflict with
congressional acts covering the same subject matter. See id. (discussing preemption of
"conflicting state or local action"). Under the Constitution's Supremacy Clause, many of these
cases can be resolved quickly, but in areas where federal and state powers may be concurrent,
complications can arise that require the application of the preemption doctrine. Simply put,
federal legislation will prevail if: (1) Congress expressly provided for its superseding state laws;
or (2) the field of legislation is covered so thoroughly by the federal law that we may assume
Congress did not intend to allow it to be supplemented or augmented by state legislation. See id.
(discussing both cases of preemption). Against this background, the repealed 1800 Bankruptcy
Act presents a unique theoretical issue. Did Congress's intention to "occupy the field" of
insolvency and bankruptcy so dominate the federal-state power balance in this area that it
precluded state legislation even after the 1800 Act's repeal? Given the desperate need for
legislation, and the failure of Congress to pass a subsequent bankruptcy statute, it would seem
likely that the Justices chose to ignore this question, thereby leaving open the possibility of co-
existing federal and state bankruptcy and insolvency remedies. For a thorough discussion of
these preemption issues, see generally id. at 1172-1212.
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until federal legislation made relief available? This concession to
continuing state power was present in the 1800 Act, which provided
that the federal statute did not displace existing state legislation
unless there was a conflict between the Bankruptcy
Act and preexisting state legislation.
92
In the first of the major bankruptcy cases, Sturges, the
Supreme Court was probably divided over whether the Constitution
conferred exclusive bankruptcy authority upon the federal
government. 93 Arguing for Sturgis the insolvent, Joseph Hopkinson
touched upon all of the issues mentioned above, but also made the
telling economic point that since most trading activity took place
across state lines, the existence of a state-based discharge system
raised a plethora of concerns.
94
Five years prior to the Sturges decision, Justice Washington
announced his view in Golden v. Prince that the Constitution created
an exclusive bankruptcy power in the federal government. 95 He
reasoned that the grant of a power to the federal government without
any mention of the states suggested that the grant was complete and
therefore exclusive. 96 In addition, the concept of a uniform bankruptcy
system logically demanded a single regulation applicable throughout
the Union; such a system necessarily depended on congressional
action and an exclusive constitutional grant of power for that
purpose. 97 Finally, he suggested that it would be incorrect to restore to
the states, by implication, a power that the Constitution specifically
assigned to the federal government. 98 The parallel inclusion of the
naturalization and bankruptcy provisions in the same constitutional
section added weight to the view that in both areas a concurrent
power would violate the framers' intent.99 Apparently, Washington's
92. See Johnson, supra note 71, at 43 (noting that when Congress "briefly executed the
terms of the bankruptcy law of 1800, Congress provided that the federal statute should not be
considered a revocation of existing or future state insolvency laws"); see also WHITE, supra note
12, at 637 (noting that in Sturges, the Court held that until Congress acted the states might
enact bankruptcy statutes, provided they did not violate the Federal Contracts Clause).
93. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
94. Id. at 180.
95. Golden v. Prince, 10 F. Cas. 542, 544-45 (C.C.D. Pa. 1814) (No. 5509).
96. Id. at 545.
97. Id. at 544-45.
98. See id. at 545 (commenting that "[t]his doctrine appears to us to be as extravagant as it
is novel").
99. See id. at 546 (finding "[t]he subject of naturalization.., strongly illustrative" and
noting that "[tlhe power to pass laws upon [naturalization], is found in the same section, and is
expressed in words of the same import, with that respecting bankruptcies"); CURRIE, supra note
74, at 148 (noting the Court's similar treatment of naturalization and bankruptcy); Stoner, supra
note 26, at 338 (commenting that Washington's interpretation of the scope of the bankruptcy
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opinion in Golden created doubt in John Marshall's mind concerning
exclusivity. On April 19, 1814, he responded to Washington's inquiry
on the subject, observing: "I had taken it for granted that the power of
passing bankruptcy laws resided in the states. It now appears to me
more doubtful." 100 Marshall's ambivalence may well have been typical
of the rest of his colleagues. Justice Brockholst Livingston in the New
York Circuit Court considered a state insolvency law to be concurrent,
as did Justice Joseph Story in the Massachusetts Circuit Court. 10 1
Thus, even before Sturges reached the Court, there were sharp and
well-documented differences of opinion on the exclusivity issue. 102
Although the comment was certainly not essential to the
narrow basis of the decision in Sturges, it is quite clear from
Marshall's opinion that he, and presumably a majority of the Court,
had arrived at a consensus that states might legislate in the
bankruptcy field as long as the constitutional requirements of the
Contracts Clause were met. To quote the Chief Justice:
It does not appear to be a violent construction of the constitution, and is certainly a
convenient one, to consider the power of the states as existing over such cases as the
laws of the Union may not reach .... If, in the opinion of congress, uniform laws
concerning bankruptcies ought not to be established, it does not follow, that partial laws
may not exist, or that state legislation on the subject matter must cease. It is not the
mere existence of the power, but its exercise, which is incompatible with the exercise of
the same power by the states. It is not the right to establish these uniform laws, but
their actual establishment, which is inconsistent with the partial acts of the states. 10 3
Marshall's summary for the Court evidenced a willingness to
deal with congressional inaction in a pragmatic way. It was acceptable
to view a failure to enact a uniform law as evidence that Congress
power was based in part on a "close reading of the text," including the fact that the bankruptcy
power is "coupled with the naturalization power").
100. Letter from John Marshall to Bushrod Washington (Apr. 19, 1814), in 8 MARSHALL
PAPERS, supra note 23, at 34; see also Stoner, supra note 26, at 337 (suggesting that the decision
in Golden launched a growing division between Washington and Marshall in the area of
bankruptcy and insolvency). That possibly is the case, but the Chief Justice's letter continues:
"But unless Congress shall act on the subject, I should feel much difficulty in saying that the
legislative power of the states respecting it is suspended by this part of the constitution." Letter
from John Marshall to Bushrod Washington (Apr. 19, 1814), in 8 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note
23, at 34.
101. Adams v. Storey, 1 Fed. Cas. 141, 143-44 (C.C.D. N.Y. 1817) (No. 66).
102. See CURRIE, supra note 74, at 150 (remarking that "there is extrinsic evidence" that
neither Livingston nor Washington "was persuaded to abandon their positions," despite not
dissenting in Sturges); MORGAN, supra note 2, at 242 (noting the "two rival theories" on how to
resolve conflicts over bankruptcy laws); WHITE, supra note 12, at 634 (noting that, even before
Sturges was heard, "the Justices differed deeply"); Johnson, supra note 71, at 48 (describing the
Sturges opinion as a compromise between two different forms of jurisprudence).
103. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 195-96 (1819). The comment raises
some interesting questions about Marshall's attitude toward dormancy, something he evaded
deftly in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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preferred to pass a partial law. In addition, the mere existence of a
constitutional power to regulate commerce, absent any congressional
exercise of that power, did not invalidate inconsistent state legislation.
Certainly this rather flexible approach contrasts sharply with
Bushrod Washington's strong sentiment that exclusivity in
appropriate cases would avoid subsequent judicial difficulties. While
he was willing to accept a contrary view in Ogden v. Saunders,
Washington's quest for certainty via an exclusive classification rather
than flexibility in practice was obvious.
10 4
Conflicts of law issues blunted state-based efforts to afford
relief to embarrassed debtors. In the Pennsylvania circuit, Justice
Washington insisted in Green v. Sarmiento that the law of the place
where a contract was executed would control both the substance of the
contract and its discharge.10 5 Concerning the enforcement of a French
bankruptcy decree, he observed that "[t]he laws of one country, can
have in themselves no extraterritorial force, except so far as the
comity of other nations may extend to give them effect... ,"106 On the
other hand, he asserted elsewhere in Sarmiento that the Federal
Constitution's Full, Faith and Credit Clause required that each state
treat the judgments and decrees of a sister state as having the same
impact within the forum state as they would in the state where
judgment had been entered. 10 7 Therefore, he was willing to enforce a
debt collection judgment of a New York state court, despite the fact
that the defendant had been awarded a Pennsylvania discharge in
bankruptcy.108 In Riston v. Content, however, Washington refused to
accept the defense of discharge under the Pennsylvania insolvency
law. 109 In his view, the contract was entered into in Maryland, and
while the promissory note was executed in Philadelphia, there was no
reason to believe that it was payable in that city.110 Washington's view
of conflicts questions in 1819 accorded with that held by the Chief
Justice, who wrote to him that "a contract is made with a knowledge
that it may be acted on by the law. But this would not apply to
104. See 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 263-64 (1827) (submitting to the Court's decision in
Sturges, but finding the power to pass bankruptcy laws as exclusively reserved to the federal
legislature); see also MORGAN, supra note 2, at 248 (speculating that, in Ogden, Justice
Washington "cast a longing backward glance at the rule of exclusiveness he had broached so long
before").
105. 10 F. Cas. 1117, 1117 (C.C.D. Pa. 1810) (No. 5760).
106. Id. Washington's view of comity appears to have been sharply influenced by the
activities of French prize courts, which he considered violations of international law.
107. Id. at 1119-20.
108. Id. at 1118-20.




contracts made out of the state." '111 In other words, both Justices
assumed that the place in which a contract was executed would also
provide the legal background against which the contract would be
construed and the remedies for enforcement or damages for breach.
The place of contracting was of paramount significance, and after
Sturges, it was determinative. 112 In Sturges, the place of contracting
was New York, and the statute authorizing discharge was a New York
law. In the companion case of MMillan v. M'Neill, the jurisdictions
awarding the discharges were not the states in which the debt had
been incurred, and thus the discharges were not valid within the
jurisdictions where the debt were contracted. 113
However, the most striking evidence of the differences between
Marshall and Washington became patent in Ogden v. Saunders,
decided in 1827.114 In his Ogden dissent, the Chief Justice seemingly
departed from any attempt to reconcile state regulatory legislation
with the consensual nature of contracting.1 15 He asserted instead that
the right to contract existed by natural law and was superior to any
governmental efforts to restrain or limit the exercise of that right.
1 6
As the editors of the Chief Justice's papers note: "No other opinion
better reveals the extent to which natural law principles informed his
constitutional jurisprudence." 1 7 On behalf of the creditors in Ogden,
Henry Wheaton had argued that contracts were derived not only from
municipal law but also "from a higher source; from those great
principles of universal law, which are binding on societies as well as
individuals."118 Adopting this position, enhancing the excessive
natural law position within it, and incorporating Daniel Webster's
similar argument, the Chief Justice elevated this natural right to
111. Letter from John Marshall to Bushrod Washington (Apr. 19, 1819), in 8 MARSHALL
PAPERS, supra note 23, at 35.
112. See Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 122-23 (1819) (examining the
New York insolvency law as applied to a contract formed in New York).
113. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 209, 212-13 (1819); see also Johnson, supra note 71, at 42-43 (noting
that, in MMillan, the bond was issued in South Carolina and the debtor secured a discharge in
Louisiana). Of course, a creditor's appearance in a state bankruptcy proceeding would bar his
subsequent action in both that state and in any other state, regardless of the original situs of
contracting.
114. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
115. See id. at 346 (remarking that "individuals do not derive from government their right to
contract, but bring that right with them into society").
116. See id. (noting that, "in a state of nature," individuals have the right to contract, and
surrender it upon entering society only so that "government may give it back again").
117. 10 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 23, at 354.
118. 25 U.S. at 222; see also 10 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 23, at 352, editorial cmt.
(discussing Wheaton's natural law argument); Johnson, supra note 71, at 43 (discussing
Wheaton's arguments).
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contract above all but the most essential state law limitations, such as
statutes prohibiting usury and evidentiary statutes of frauds. 119 To
further emphasize the independent and preeminent natural law right
to contract freely, as well as Contracts Clause limitations upon state
authority, Marshall concluded:
In all these cases, whether the thing prohibited be the exercise of mere political power,
or legislative action on individuals, the prohibition is complete and total. There is no
exception from it. Legislation of every description is comprehended within it. A State is
as entirely forbidden to pass laws impairing the obligation of contracts, as to make
treaties, or coin money. 120
This extraordinary claim for a sweeping and fundamental natural
right to contract was vehemently rejected by Bushrod Washington and
his colleagues in the Ogden majority.
121
Washington's main criticism of Marshall's dissenting opinion
centered on the Chief Justice's contention that contract was a natural
right which, standing alone, invalidated any state efforts to limit the
obligation of contracts. 122 Conceding that a natural law right to
contract existed in international law by virtue of "the common law of
nations," Washington distinguished such public undertakings from
agreements made by private individuals. 123 Private contracts were not
mere moral commitments; they were binding legal obligations between
119. See Johnson, supra note 71, at 46 (commenting that, according to Marshall, the right to
contract "was a right based on the law of nature, and no legislative act could impose upon a
contract conditions not agreed to by the parties"). David Currie comments that Marshall "seemed
to flirt with the idea that the Constitution protected agreements whether or not they were
recognized by state law," and that this view was not unlike that which later generations would
attach to the concept of "freedom of contract" under the Due Process Clauses. CURRIE, supra note
74, at 152. Professor White notes that "positivist conceptions of law, emphasizing that written
legislative or judicial acts created and defined the full scope of human rights and responsibilities,
had not... fully displaced natural law conceptions in jurisprudential discourse," and that the
right to acquire property in Marshall's view was unique and intrinsic. WHITE, supra note 12, at
305-06 ("In Sturges v. Crowninshield, the Court had already held that debtor relief laws could
not constitutionally affect obligations incurred before their passage."). White also suggests that
Marshall had approached this position in the Sturges opinion. Id. at 305 (citing Sturges v.
Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 122 (1819)).
120. Ogden, 25 U.S. at 335.
121. Id. at 258-59 (rejecting both the moral law and the universal law-that "all men are
bound to perform their contracts"-as the basis of the obligation of contracts, and accepting the
'municipal law of the State").
122. See id. at 258 (rejecting the view that the states would have consented to a
constitutional principal of contract that would have abridged the States' legislative power over
contracts).
123. Id. at 259:
Whilst I admit, then, that this common law of nations, which has been
mentioned, may form in part the obligation of a contract, I must
unhesitatingly insist, that this is to be taken in strict subordination to the
municipal laws of the land where the contract is made, or is to be executed.
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individuals, and the enforcement of those rights and responsibilities
fell within the authority of the state in which the contract was made.
These private contracts were subject to municipal law as well; indeed,
there were "few laws which concern the general police of a state, or the
government of its citizens, in their intercourse with each other, or
with strangers, which may not in some way or other affect the
contracts which they have entered into, or may thereafter form."'
24
Whenever positive laws of the place of contracting conflicted with the
common law of nations-that is, natural law-the local municipal law
would govern.' 25 Should the parties contractually stipulate that
another state's law should govern, that chosen state's law would
normally apply under principles of comity, unless some public policy of
the forum state precluded enforcement.126
Although the 1819 Sturges precedent rested on the
unconstitutionality of a retrospective state bankruptcy law,
Washington pointed out in Ogden that the date of the law's enactment
had nothing to do with its impact upon contracts. He had already
conceded that virtually every state law had the potential to impair
private contracts. 127 Although the parties might claim that only laws
existing at the time of contracting should be incorporated within the
extrinsic conditions of contracting, they might reasonably anticipate
that their contract could be affected by subsequent positive law.
Washington went one step further, suggesting that each state might
enact a broad statute that reserved to the legislature the power to
change the law governing the discharge of contracts, regardless of the
time of the contract's execution or the date of the statute's
enactment. 128
Finally, after strongly restating his belief that the bankruptcy
power was exclusively committed to Congress, Washington bowed to
the contrary views of his colleagues on the bench and accepted their
position that the bankruptcy power was concurrent in the federal and
state governments. 129 However, he also reiterated his belief that
124. Id. at 258-59.
125. Id. at 260-61.
126. Id. at 259-60.
127. See id. at 259 (mentioning "the laws of evidence," or laws "which concern remedies-
frauds and perjuries-laws of registration, and those which affect landlord and tenant, sales at
auction, acts of limitation, and those which limit the fees of professional men, and the charges of
tavern keepers, and multitude of others" as potentially impairing private contracts).
128. See id. at 267 ("Nor can it be unjust, or oppressive, to declare by law, that contracts
subsequently entered into, may be discharged in a way different from that which the parties
have provided ... ").
129. See id. at 270 (giving the "decent respect due" to state bankruptcy laws and recognizing
that "[t]his has always been the language of this Court").
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respect for the wisdom, integrity, and patriotism of state legislatures
required him to "presume in favour of [the] validity [of their
legislation] until its violation of the constitution is proved beyond all
reasonable doubt."130
Rarely were the differences between Washington and Marshall
so starkly demonstrated as they were in Ogden v. Saunders. Professor
White, perhaps taking his cue from Richard Hofstadter's analysis of
property rights in Jacksonian America,1 3 1elaborates on this point by
suggesting that the Ogden Court's alternatives, like those in the 1823
occupying claimant case Green v. Biddle,132 involved choices between
two types of property rights. One category concerned the rights
inherent in strict adherence to preexisting contractual arrangements;
the other was the natural justice and practical utility of protecting
those who produced economic and social benefits through their
enterprises but lacked a legal claim with which to protect themselves
or the value of the efforts they invested in their property. 133 A brief
review of Bushrod Washington's work on circuit suggests that his
views of property rights, legislative power, and the legal needs of
commercial activity are partially responsible for his divergence from
the position taken in Ogden by the Chief Justice.
134
American economic thought began to alter its understanding of
property perhaps as early as 1800 and certainly after 1819 and the
Missouri Compromise of 1820. Earlier, Thomas Jefferson and virtually
all of his contemporaries had viewed commercial activity as a
necessary adjunct to, or handmaiden of, agriculture. More
importantly, as Joseph Dorfman suggested, "It is only those men who
have attained a modicum of economic independence and welfare-that
is to say property-who can rise to their rational task in a republican
130. Id. This is a paraphrase of the principle that Professor White terms the "reasonable
doubt rule," citing id. at 295.
131. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION AND THE MEN WHO
MADE IT 51-52, 56-57, 67 (Vintage Books 1954) (1949) (arguing that Jackson and his followers
favored property laws that encouraged entrepreneurial-risk capital, rather than an economic
system favoring static wealth and underutilization of assets).
132. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 69-94 (1823). The 1823 opinion of the Court, delivered by Bushrod
Washington, was designed to soften the abrupt tone of Justice Story's 1821 pronouncement. See
WHITE, supra note 12, at 645 (commenting that Washington's opinion "appeared to be a self-
conscious correction of some of the deficiencies in Story's earlier effort," and that "Washington
also took pains to communicate his sensitivity to the political consequences of the Court's
interference with Kentucky land claims").
133. See WHITE, supra note 12, at 651 (noting that Ogden v. Saunders was "virtually
unique"); see also Stoner, supra note 26, at 340 (contrasting the views of Marshall and
Washington).
134. See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
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society."'13 5 However, even Jefferson recognized that the independent
and diverse needs of commerce after the turn of the century began to
exert demands upon the legal system, and occasionally commerce
tended to dominate agricultural activity. 36 Although ready access to
property democratized the earlier process of joining an electoral
franchise through the acquisition of realty, the 1819 depression began
to cast doubt upon the inevitability of a man's rise to riches, and the
protective cushion of debtor relief became more attractive to a new
generation of entrepreneurs. The protective tariff proposals pending in
Congress between 1819 and 1821 were sharply criticized by John
Taylor of Caroline, 137 who in Tyranny Unmasked asserted that any
such governmental interference constituted a violation of the natural
right to engage in commerce.138 In addition, protectionism obstructed
freewill exchanges of goods and substituted extortion of profits by the
government or those to whom the state granted exclusive privileges.
139
Finally, as Taylor's objection to the slavery provisions of the Missouri
Compromise highlighted, restrictions that dealt with slavery were
seen as but the first step toward new governmental usurpations of
personal liberty and property. Dorfman comments that Taylor was so
heated on the subject that "he came forth with the most rigid defense
of property, a defense that denied even to the states themselves any
right to 'interfere' with 'property,' and of course slaves were
property."'140 Economic, social, and political influences each played a
part in moving Americans away from a profound respect for static
vested property rights to a more relativist position, which was
increasingly tolerant of public limitations on private property rights
that facilitated commercial and industrial activity in a rapidly
diversifying economy.
It is against this shifting political theory that the differences
between Marshall and Washington ought to be examined. Specifically,
it is notable that the Chief Justice's circuit covered the agrarian states
135. 1 JOSEPH DORFMAN, THE ECONOMIC MIND IN AMERICAN CIVILIZATION 1606-1865, at 445
(1946).
136. See id. at 446 (noting Jefferson's concern that state "[]egislators were prone to infection
with an overdose of 'patriotism,' especially when it coincided with the immediate pecuniary
interests of members").
137. Taylor, perhaps the foremost advocate for states' rights in Virginia, was traditionally
identified by the name of his plantation, Caroline.
138. DORFMAN, supra note 135, at 388-89. For a fuller discussion of Taylor's advocacy of
laissez faire economics and his attack on the protective tariff, see EUGENE T. MUDGE, THE
SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN TAYLOR OF CAROLINE: A STUDY IN JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY 161-
68, 186-91 (1939).
139. DORFMAN, supra note 135, at 388-89.
140. Id. at 402.
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of Virginia and North Carolina, while Washington's circuit
encompassed the more commercial and industrial areas of
Pennsylvania and New Jersey. Washington's judicial attention
inevitably involved real property and public land cases, but
commercial law, admiralty litigation, and the administration of
marine insurance dominated his trial dockets. 141 In addition, his
extended residence in Philadelphia during circuit court terms placed
him in the commercial, financial, and industrial heart of the United
States and provided him with additional proof that the law needed to
move from a rigid support for vested property rights toward a
humanitarian bankruptcy system that would provide both debt relief
and rehabilitation through state or federal legislation.
C. Green v. Biddle, Federalism, and Legislative Power
Green v. Biddle142 reminds us that natural law doctrine was a
matter of discussion in the Supreme Court some four years before
Chief Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion in Ogden. Because
Marshall and his family were deeply involved in Kentucky land
transactions, 143 the final opinion in the case was assigned to Bushrod
Washington, partly to assuage public criticism of the terse 1821
opinion in Green written two years earlier by Justice Story. 144 Green
involved a Contracts Clause challenge to the occupying claimant laws
141. JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 118 (showing the number of cases within each category that
Washington heard while on the Supreme Court, and the number of cases within each category
that Washington heard while on the circuit court). Compare id. app. A at 273 (showing the
number of cases within each category in Pennsylvania from 1801 to 1835), and id. app. B at 280-
81 (showing the number of cases within each category that Marshall heard on the circuit court
from 1802 to 1833 and the number of cases within each category that Marshall heard on the
Supreme Court from 1801 to 1835), with id. app. A at 277 (showing the number of cases within
each category in Virginia from 1802 to 1833), and id. app. B at 290-91 (showing the number of
cases within each category that Washington heard on the circuit court from 1803 to 1829 and the
number of cases within each category that Washington heard while on the Supreme Court from
1806 to 1829).
142. See, e.g., Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 83 (1823) (discussing the "maxim of
equality, and of natural law, nemo debet locupletari alienajactura").
143. See 1 MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 23, at 100-04 (discussing Marshall's Kentucky land
speculation); see also HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 590 (noting that "[b]eyond the
substantial earnings of his law practice, the bulk of the Chief Justice's estate may be said to
derive from wise and circumspect investments in undeveloped lands"); R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN
MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE SUPREME COURT 16-17 (2001) (pointing out that the
Marshall family's land acquisitions had the goal not of accumulating land, but rather increasing
family wealth through speculation in land grants).
144. See supra note 132. Marshall declined to sit in the case, and hence his modifying
influence was not present at the 1821 deliberations. Justice Washington was absent the entire
1821 Term. WHITE, supra note 12, at 373, 643.
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of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.145 These state statutes were
enacted to provide an equitable system for adjusting claims to
Kentucky land between nonresident grantees and individuals who had
long resided upon and improved the land parcels. 146 The 1792 compact
between Virginia and the future state of Kentucky provided: "[A]ll
private rights and interests of lands, within the said District
[Kentucky], derived from the laws of Virginia [prior to such
separation], shall remain valid and secure under the laws of the
proposed State, and shall be determined by the laws now existing in
this State [Virginia]." 147 Congress approved the compact, as required
by the Constitution, and Kentucky was duly admitted to the Union. In
1797 and again in 1812, the Kentucky legislature enacted legislation
that protected the financial interests of, and improvements made by,
the so-called "occupying claimant" residents of Kentucky. 148 These
statutes provided relief from the common law rule that improvements
to realty made by tenants or unauthorized squatters reverted to the
legal owner of the land at the end of the lease, or when the parcel was
recovered by an ejection action. 14 9 Counsel for the holders of Virginia
legal titles challenged the statutes as unconstitutional state laws
impairing the obligation of contracts.
150
Counsel for the title holders argued before the Supreme Court
in the 1821 Term, but counsel for the occupying claimants made no
appearance. 151 Justice Story's terse opinion for the Court invalidated
the Kentucky statutes because they violated the Contracts Clause and
also violated the Virginia-Kentucky compact that formed a part of the
state constitution.152 The Story opinion's brevity as well as its failure
to include citations drew public ire, as did the fact that the occupying
claimants under the Kentucky statutes were not represented at oral
argument. 153 On the motion of Henry Clay, a former law clerk in
145. 21 U.S. at 11.
146. Id. at 11-12.
147. Id. at 11.
148. Id. at 11-12.
149. See id. at 70-77 (describing the statutory provisions and common law rules).
150. Id. at 3.
151. Id. at 1.
152. Id. at 13, 15-16. Story pointedly rejected the contention that the changes in state law
were simply alterations in the remedy afforded to contract holders. See also id. at 17 ("If those
acts so change the nature and extent of existing remedies, as materially to impair the rights and
interests of the owner, they are just as much a violation of the compact, as if they directly
overturned his rights and interests.").
153. See WHITE, supra note 12, at 642-44 (discussing the controversy that resulted from
Story's opinion); see also JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 79-80 (suggesting that the Court's
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Justice Washington's law practice, the Court withheld Story's opinion
and scheduled the case for reargument.
54
Although Justice Washington reached the same conclusion as
Story after reargument, his opinion is considered a "self-conscious
correction of some of the deficiencies of Story's earlier effort."'155 In
addition, as Professor White suggests, Washington was sensitive to
the fact that the Court was interfering with a state's attempt to
protect its own residents. Although this task was accomplished in the
absence of Justice Thomas Todd, the Court's specialist on the
complexities of Kentucky real property law, 156 Washington's purported
lack of familiarity with Kentucky land law was partially compensated
for by his references to natural and civil law principles in support of
the sanctity of titles to real property, and the resultant rights of the
successful claimants to demand an account for the mesne profits that
had accrued to the occupying tenants. 157 This was but the beginning of
an effort to consider the Interstate Compact Clause as a decisive
factor in deciding the case; indeed, the inclusion of both constitutional
provisions in Section 10 of Article I of the Constitution suggests that
the Compact Clause was not originally intended to be governed by the
Contracts Clause.158  Natural law principles would have been
persuasive precedents had the Court wished to consider the Kentucky-
Virginia compact as between two distinct sovereign entities. Without
conceding the sovereignty of the states, and without denying that the
Contracts Clause applied to interstate compacts, Washington
nevertheless deftly implied in his opinion that natural and civil law159
disposition of Green v. Biddle polarized the states' rights opposition to the jurisdiction of the U.S.
Supreme Court).
154. Green, 21 U.S. at 17-18. Professor White stresses the brevity and inadequate citations
in Story's opinion as two causes for public dissatisfaction; in addition, Story had ignored the
question whether the operation of the Compact Clause was governed by the Contracts Clause.
WHITE, supra note 12, at 643-45.
155. WHITE, supra note 12, at 645.
156. See id. at 319-20 (discussing Todd's knowledge of Kentucky land law and the role it
played on the Court and noting that both Marshall and Washington "needed Todd's advice in
threading their way through the unfamiliar complexities of Kentucky land law").
157. Green, 21 U.S. at 77-81.
158. WHITE, supra note 12, at 645.
159. Contemporary American use of civil law sources seems to have relied most commonly
upon the ius commune; this was the generally accepted pre-Napoleonic law of continental
Europe, based to a large degree upon usages drawn from Justinian's Digest. Bushrod
Washington and his contemporaries would have become acquainted with Roman law in
connection with their classical studies, and Washington's training with James Wilson, a
graduate of St. Andrews University in Scotland, would have deepened his knowledge of Roman
law and the Justinian corpus. See Kermit L. Hall, Introduction to 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES
WILSON xiii, xv-xviii (Kermit L. Hall & Mark D. Hall eds., 2007); 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES
WILSON 7-10 (Robert G. McCloskey ed., 1967) (discussing Wilson's education).
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principles would also support the unconstitutionality of the Kentucky
occupying claimant statutes. 160 A more forceful argument based on
natural law might well have forced the Court to open the door to a
dangerous threat to limited government: could an interstate compact,
accepted by Congress, unite federal and state sovereignty in such a
way that the Constitution itself could be circumvented?' 6
The safest route-indeed the judicious route-was to subsume
the Compact Clause within the Contracts Clause, as Justice
Washington did by asserting that "the constitution of the United
States embraces all contracts, executed or executory, whether between
individuals, or between a State and individuals; and that a State has
no more power to impair an obligation into which she herself has
entered, than she can the contracts of individuals."'1 62 Four short years
later, he would draw back from Marshall's defense of contract as a
natural right that could not be altered by any legislative action. 63
Perhaps at that later time, Washington recalled Justice William
Johnson's dissent in Green:
I cannot admit, that it was ever the intention of the framers of this constitution, or of
the parties to this compact, or of the United States, in sanctioning that compact, that
Kentucky should be for ever chained down in a state of hopeless imbecility-embarrassed
with a thousand minute discriminations drawn from the common law, refinements on
mesne profits, set-offs, etc. appropriate to a state of society, and a state of property,
having no analogy whatever to the actual state of things in Kentucky-and yet, no power
on earth existing to repeal or to alter, or to effect those accommodations to the ever
varying state of human things, which the necessities or improvements of society may
require. 164
Things were changing rapidly in the 1820s, not only in new concepts of
property rights, but also in the recognition of the need for flexibility in
constitutional construction. Johnson understood these changes in
1823; it took the Federalist Bushrod Washington another four years to
understand that societal need should play a more formative role in
constitutional construction. 165
160. Green, 21 U.S. at 78, 81.
161. White suggests that the compact theory of government-that in joining the federal union
the states had not surrendered their sovereignty-had been argued to the Court in Green, but
apparently was rejected by the Court. See WHITE, supra note 12, at 281 (noting that the compact
theory had been "vigorously argued by critics of Green v. Biddle").
162. Green, 21 U.S. at 92.
163. See Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 270 (1827) (holding that a state law
restricting the right to contract was constitutional until proven otherwise "beyond all reasonable
doubt").
164. Green, 21 U.S. at 104.
165. See Herbert A. Johnson, The Constitutional Thought of William Johnson, 89 S.C. HIST.
MAG. 132, 145 (1988) (claiming that Johnson saw society and human relationships as formative




Bushrod Washington's three decades on the Supreme Court
were marked by a persistent demand to apply international law, as
required by the treaties entered into by the United States and
supplemented by the customary law of nations. Because Philadelphia
remained the de facto diplomatic capital of the new nation until well
after 1820, Washington was directly involved in the inevitable clashes
between foreign ministers and their American neighbors. His
experience ranged the gamut of cases, from critical issues in
international affairs to gritty tort litigation arising from fisticuffs in
the back alleys of the city of not-too-brotherly love.
Undoubtedly, Justice Washington's most important
international law opinion on the Supreme Court was in Smith v.
Maryland.166 On the merits, this was a straightforward decision. The
1780 wartime forfeiture statute enacted by Maryland provided for the
general seizure of all Maryland realty owned by British subjects, and
the Supreme Court held that since no additional state action was
required to vest title in the state, the 1783 peace treaty and the 1794
Jay Treaty did not protect the title of William Smith. 16 7 Specifically,
the treaties covered "future confiscations" of American realty and thus
were effective only for those British owners who held legal or
equitable title after September 3, 1783.168 What was significant in
Smith was not the resolution of the substantive question; quite the
contrary, it was the fact that the Supreme Court took it upon itself to
reexamine the correctness of the Maryland Court of Appeals's
construction of the 1780 state statute.1 69 At oral argument, counsel
debated the impact of Section 34 of the 1789 Judiciary Act, which
might be construed to require the Supreme Court to accept the
Maryland Court of Appeals's view of the state statute.1 70 In his Smith
opinion, Washington virtually ignored the suggestion that state courts
could bind the Supreme Court's exercise of "federal question"
jurisdiction through resolution of state law questions that were critical
to the exercise of federal jurisdiction.1 71 As Justice William Johnson
would subsequently point out in Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee,
shackling the Supreme Court to state law decisions in treaty
166. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 286, 304-06 (1810).
167. Id. at 288, 304-06.
168. Id. at 304, 306.
169. Id. at 305-06.
170. Id. at 297, 302, 304. Justice Washington simply noted the issue in passing and then
proceeded to construe de novo the Maryland statute. Id. at 304.
171. See id. at 304-05 (failing to examine the Maryland court's construction of the law).
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interpretation cases would render an appeal to the Court "worse than
nugatory."172 Justice Washington's jurisdictional decision in Smith
was thus a recognition of the view taken more directly and
persuasively by Justice Story in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee: in
appellate business involving federal questions-conflicts about the
meaning and application of the Federal Constitution, statutes enacted
by Congress pursuant to the Constitution, and treaties entered into by
the United States-there was a critical need for a single adjudicatory
authority to avoid confusion and international embarrassment.
Interpretations that varied among the American states were both
destructive of federalism and subversive of the Court's role as the
highest tribunal of international law within the United States. 173 As
Story put it so clearly, in matters subsumed within the ambit of the
federal questions, those cases that "enter into the national policy,
affect the national rights, and may compromit the national
sovereignty"'174 demand "uniformity of decisions throughout the United
States" and enforceability through appeals to the U.S. Supreme
Court. 175 And as Washington tacitly accepted in Smith, in allowing
federal question appeals, the Justices of the Supreme Court
necessarily must review de novo those constructions of state law upon
which federal jurisdiction depended.
While it was important to assert the Supreme Court's appellate
authority in federal jurisdiction appeals, it was equally important that
the Court's en banc sessions not be overwhelmed with minor cases
involving foreign diplomats. Congress had wisely authorized the
federal circuit courts to try cases involving the private litigation of
accredited ministers and their staffs. Justice Washington's circuit
court docket had a number of trials on criminal indictments of
Philadelphians accused of assaulting diplomats. In United States v.
Liddle,176 a constable defended himself in the course of arresting an
employee of the Spanish embassy. Washington released the constable,
reasoning that the accused would have to have been aware of the
status of the diplomat before incurring penalties under the federal
criminal statute protecting foreign ministers. In addition, it was not
172. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603, 632 (1812).
173. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 334, 335, 347-48 (1816).
174. Id. at 335. Compromit in a general sense is equivalent to compromise, but it is a more
forceful expression of the idea that allowing such a jurisdictional matter to remain open to state
determination would leave the matter of national sovereignty open to negotiation. Cf. THE
OXFORD UNIVERSAL DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES 358 (C.T. Onions ed., Clarendon
Press 3d ed. 1955) (denoting "compromit" and "compromise" as synonyms).
175. Martin, 14 U.S. at 347-48.
176. 26 F. Cas. 936 (C.C.D. Pa. 1808) (No. 15,598).
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clear whether the diplomat had struck the first blow, which would
exonerate the constable under the federal statute, leaving only civil
liability for assault and criminal sanctions, if any, to trial in state
courts.
1 7 7
Scienter also played a role in the colorful circuit court
prosecution in United States v. Hand.178 Staging a party to celebrate
the czar's birthday, the Russian charge d'affairs decided to amuse
Philadelphia passersby with a colored window showing an American
vessel's entry into the St. Petersburg harbor. Unfortunately, the
imperial crown was depicted over the flag of the United States flying
at the ship's stern, and the crowd took offense. The defendant arrived
at the scene intoxicated and, after the envoy's apology and
explanation, fired a pistol at the window and narrowly missed the
diplomat who was engaged in removing the controversial stained glass
window. At trial for assault on an international embassy, the accused
was acquitted by Justice Washington, who pointed out that the
government had not proven that the defendant was aware that the
premises he attacked with a pistol was a foreign legation. 179
Washington also discharged an application for a federal habeas
corpus writ sought by the Spanish legation. The secretary of the
legation had been arrested for passing a forged check and was held in
a Pennsylvania state prison. °80 Although Justice Washington conceded
that the secretary was entitled to protection under international law,
he pointed out that the federal statutes not only failed to confer such
jurisdiction on the lower federal courts, but also did not authorize
issuance of federal habeas corpus writs for the release of prisoners
held under state authority.181 Washington felt that under
international law the lower federal courts should have been given
jurisdiction in such a case, and but for his sense of judicial restraint he
might well have acceded to the legation's request. Washington wrote:
I am one of those, I confess, who have always thought it would have been better, if the
legislature of the Union, in allotting to the several courts the jurisdiction they were to
exercise, had occupied the whole ground marked out by the constitution; but, I am not
one of those, who think it a commendable quality in a judge to enlarge, by construction,
the sphere of his jurisdiction that of the federal courts is of a limited nature, and cannot
be extended beyond the grant. 
1 8 2
177. Id. at 937.
178. 26 F. Cas. 103 (C.C.D. Pa. 1810) (No. 15,297).
179. Id. at 104-05.
180. Exparte Cabrera, 4 F. Cas. 964. 965 (C.C.D. Pa. 1805) (No. 2278).




Given that state of mind, Washington doubtless felt exonerated
when he was selected to deliver the Supreme Court's opinion in United
States v. Ortega, which raised the constitutionality of Congress's
decision to assign to the U.S. circuit courts the trial of criminal
indictments for assaults on foreign diplomats.18 3 Ortega came to the
Court on certified question from Washington's Pennsylvania Circuit
Court and involved yet another assault on a Spanish diplomat. The
Court was asked to resolve whether the Constitution required such a
case to be determined by the Supreme Court as part of its original
jurisdiction. Noting that the case was a public prosecution and not a
case to which a diplomat was a party, the Supreme Court held that
Congress properly left trial jurisdiction with the federal circuit
courts. 184
E. The Dilemma of The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon
8 5
The demands of international goodwill came into conflict with
Washington's sense of property rights in the troubling case of
McFaden v. The Exchange, which was tried before the Pennsylvania
Circuit Court during its October 1811 term.8 6 An unarmed American
merchant ship, The Exchange, was captured on the high seas by a
French warship and carried to a French port, where a French prize
court condemned her, presumably for unneutral behavior. Thereafter,
the vessel was refitted and commissioned as a public warship in the
Napoleonic navy.
Driven by necessity into a Philadelphia port, the vessel,
renamed The Balaou, No. 5, was libeled by her former owners.
Apparently under the direction of the State Department, the federal
District Attorney 8 7 for Pennsylvania urged that the libel claim be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Pennsylvania District Court
183. 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 467, 468-69 (1826).
184. Id. at 469.
185. The first named claimant for the vessel was one John McFaddon. The Schooner
Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). However, the claimant was identified in
the circuit court proceeding as 'McFaden." McFaden v. The Exchange, 16 F. Cas. 85 (C.C.D. Pa.
1811) (No. 8786). To avoid confusion, the Supreme Court's version of the name has been used
throughout this discussion.
186. 16 F. Cas. 85 (C.C.D. Pa. 1811) (No. 8786).
187. Like present day United States Attorneys, the District Attorneys appointed for each
state were charged with the responsibility of conducting prosecutions and civil litigation on
behalf of the United States.
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declined jurisdiction, and the libellant owners appealed to Justice
Washington's circuit court.1
88
At the outset Washington accepted the submissions of
Alexander Dallas on behalf of the United States, observing that in
such cases it was appropriate that the federal District Attorney
appear to advise the courts of the position of the executive branch,
which is constitutionally charged with the conduct of foreign
relations.18 9 From the evidence submitted by Dallas, Washington
concluded that the ship was a public warship of the French navy, and
that the issue was the district court's jurisdiction rather than the
ownership dispute. 190 Observing that the writings of Cornelius van
Bynkershoek had been roughly handled by counsel on one side and
highly eulogized by the other, Washington noted that the author's
treatise limited the sovereign's exception from court jurisdiction. 191 A
sovereign, and thus presumably its ministers, had a personal
exemption from jurisdiction, but its property was nevertheless subject
to adjudications in the courts of the national territory in which the
property was located. Justice Washington cited nearly a century of
acquiescence to that doctrine as well as its acceptance by the
eighteenth-century civilian author Thomas Rutherforth. Pressed by
the arguments of counsel, he persisted in denying that the public
armed vessels of a friendly foreign power should be exempt from the
district court's admiralty jurisdiction.1 92 Consequently, Washington
remanded the case to the district court for trial, but not without
misgivings:
I am fully sensible to the delicate nature of the question which is here decided, and I feel
cheered by reflecting that the error in my judgment if I have committed one, can and
will be corrected by a superior tribunal; for surely a question of such national
importance as this, ought not, and I hope will not, rest upon the decision of this court. I
can at the same time truly declare that if I could be so wicked as to decide this case
different from the opinion which I must sincerely entertain respecting it, my humble
genius and talents would not enable me to give one single reason which my conscience
or judgment could approve. 
19 3
188. McFaden, 16 F. Cas. at 86. For an extended discussion of the importance of this case
and attention to the preliminaries, see HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 531-34.
189. McFaden, 16 F. Cas. at 86.
190. Id. at 86-88.
191. Id. at 87-88.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 88.
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After such an invitation to appeal, what litigant or attorney could
resist? Appeal they did, and reversed he was.
194
In reversing Washington, Chief Justice Marshall's opinion
began with a broad statement of the degree to which international law
required forbearance and evenhandedness in the conduct of relations
between sovereign nations. He pointed out that the arrival of a naval
warship in the ports of a friendly nation normally raises no concern or
threat to peace, provided that the territorial sovereign has no
prohibition against such an entry.195 To the Court it appeared that
there was "a principle of public law, that national ships of war,
entering the port of a friendly power open for their reception, are to be
considered as exempted by the consent of that power from its
jurisdiction."'1.96  Until the territorial sovereign unequivocally
demonstrates that such use of its territory is unacceptable, the judicial
authorities of the visited nation cannot appropriately subject a
friendly visiting warship to their jurisdiction to determine rights
claimed by a private party. The Exchange, now a French public vessel
of war, had come to the United States under an implied promise that
while she carried herself in a friendly manner she could not be
subjected to the jurisdiction of the United States or its courts.
197
Therefore, the district court was correct to dismiss the libel action, and
Justice Washington's decision was reversed.198
To a degree, Washington's jaundiced view of the irregular
proceedings of French prize courts1 99 may well have clouded his
judgment, but the case did represent a difficult problem of balancing
an American citizen's property rights against broader issues of
international law and practice that, if breached by the federal courts,
might well embarrass the political branches of government and trigger
tensions in diplomatic affairs. Those public law considerations
weighed heavily upon Washington's colleagues, including John
Marshall. Indeed, from Washington's comments at the end of his
circuit court opinion (quoted in part above), it seems obvious that he
was also highly persuaded by public law considerations despite his
ultimate decision favoring property rights.
194. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812); see also HASKINS
& JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 531-43 (placing the Supreme Court decision within the broader
consideration of the validity of French prize court decrees).
195. The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 136-39, 141.
196. Id. at 145-46.
197. Id. at 146-47.
198. Id. at 147.




Another contrast between Washington and the Chief Justice
emerges in their differing approaches to statutory construction. In
terms of economic reasoning, the case of United States v. Fisher200 is
particularly revealing. Fisher involved the question of a federal
government priority in the assets of a bankrupt debtor and the degree
to which such a priority would create a secret lien that in commercial
practice would severely undermine the confidence of would-be
investors.201 After a careful analysis of the two statutes involved,
Washington, in the Pennsylvania Circuit Court, concluded that a
federal government priority was limited to cases in which the
bankrupt debtor's assets were involved in transactions with public
officers or other officials involved in the collection of public accounts. 20 2
A 1797 federal statute granting a priority in its first three sections
appeared to limit its operation to those officers who, as Washington
noted, were either well-known or identifiable and whose business with
the bankrupt debtor would have served as a warning that some
governmental interest might give priority to assets in the event of an
insolvency or bankruptcy.20 3 The fifth and sixth sections of the same
statute purportedly gave a government priority when "any revenue
officer or other person thereafter ... [became] indebted to the United
States by bond or otherwise became insolvent." This gave rise to the
liberal interpretation that under all circumstances any individual's
estate might be impacted by a federal government priority.20 4 As
Washington's jury charge below indicated, Section 62 of the 1800
bankruptcy statute expressly preserved all previous statutory
priorities granted to the federal government: "[N]othing contained in
this law shall in any manner affect the right of preference to prior
satisfaction of debts due to the United States, as secured or provided
by any law heretofore passed .. ."205 The case thus raised the issue of
the construction of the terms "or other person" in the 1797 Act.
Justice Washington at the outset of his jury charge in the
circuit court began by concluding that the scope of the U.S. priority
was not clear, given the divergence of sections five and six from the
first four sections, which simply mentioned "revenue officers" and
200. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358 (1805).
201. Id. at 385.
202. United States v. Fisher, 25 F. Cas. 1087, 1089 (C.C.D. Pa. 1803) (No. 15,103).
203. Id. at 1088.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1087.
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"persons accountable for public money."206 He found that "the evident
intention is different from the import of the literal expressions used in
some part of the law, [and legislative] intention should prevail." 20 7 In
seeking to divine Congress's intent, he considered the consequences if
the concluding sections of the statute were held to control the
applicability of the sections that did not contain the "or other persons"
phrase-namely that secret, or inchoate, liens would weaken the
confidence of businessmen in their extending credit to others. 208 Not
mentioned in Washington's opinion is the possibility that such a secret
lien would also impair the negotiability of bills of exchange in
interstate and foreign commerce. 20 9
On appeal by writ of error to the Supreme Court, Washington's
view of the law was reversed by an opinion delivered by Chief Justice
Marshall. He began by asserting that the intent of the 1797 statute
was plain, and thus judicial construction was precluded.210 The first
four sections and the two following established priorities in favor of
the federal government, but the first four did so in regard to specified
officials, while the latter two included within their scope a more
expanded catalog of obligations to the government that should be
granted priority against general creditors in insolvency or bankruptcy
proceedings. 211 Had ambiguity been present, the arguments on behalf
of the creditors would have been appropriate, particularly if the rights
they claimed were fundamental. However, resort to judicial
construction of "only a political regulation" based on the claim that the
statute's result is commercially "inconvenient" would substitute the
206. Id. at 1088.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1088-89. Since the priority was claimed on the basis that the bankrupt had
endorsed a bill of exchange to the Bank of the United States and that it was subsequently
protested, only a broad construction of the 1797 statute would bring the bankrupt within its
terms as an "other person." On the difficulties inherent in inchoate liens, see generally HASKINS
& JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 401-05, 575-87.
209. The Marshall Court subsequently had to deal with what might be termed "secret
forfeitures" under the Embargo Acts, upholding these enforcement measures and disregarding a
claim under a bottomry bond. In admiralty law, bottomry bonds were used to secure loans made
while a ship was away from its home port; they facilitated the extension of credit when
emergency repairs were required. Since forfeitures under the Embargo Acts attached when a
ship departed in violation of its Embargo bond, but were not enforced until its return, the lien of
a bottomry bond was junior to that under the Embargo statutes. Potential lenders might well be
dissuaded by the possible existence of such a "secret lien" under the Embargo laws. HASKINS &
JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 427-28, 492. However, in Fisher, Robert G. Harper had argued
eloquently against such "peculiar and secret liens, indiscreetly multiplied," specifically noting
the threats they posed to credit and the conduct of commerce. United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 358, 371 (1805).
210. Fisher, 6 U.S. at 386.
211. Id. at 388-89.
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judge's views for those of the legislature.212 Such a "constrained
interpretation" assumed that the legislature had not already
considered that matter and had not balanced the "inconvenience"
against the benefit of a broad priority to the federal government. 213 In
a rare departure from his usual practice of silent acquiescence,
Bushrod Washington appended an explanation of his reasoning, which
is included below. While he took no part in Supreme Court appeal, he
nevertheless felt that the importance of the issue justified and
required an explanation.214 For the most part, his explanation followed
the reasoning of his circuit court charge, but there is heat in his
additional material: "So if the literal expressions of the law would lead
to absurd, unjust or inconvenient consequences, such a construction
ought to be given as to avoid such consequences, if, from the whole
purview of the law, and giving effect to the words used, it may fairly
be done."2
15
Despite his firm stand in the Fisher case, 216 Washington tended
to follow the plain meaning of statutes, as is demonstrated by his
holding in the case of Pierce Butler and his slave Ben, decided in
Pennsylvania's Circuit Court in 1806217 and resulting in the slave's
emancipation. The critical issue was whether Butler, a perennial but
peripatetic congressman from South Carolina, had become a resident
of Pennsylvania. 21 8  There were two exceptions to the 1780
Pennsylvania statute emancipating slaves then or thereafter living
within the state. Members of Congress who brought slaves with them
to Philadelphia were excepted from statute, as were sojourners who
were simply passing through Pennsylvania accompanied by one or
more slaves. 21 9 On circuit, Justice Washington found that because
Butler resided in Philadelphia with Ben for a two-year period when
Butler was not a member of Congress, the congressional exception was
212. Id. at 390.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 397-405. On Washington's usual practice, see JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 122
("Judge Washington, although rarely delivering opinions of the Court in the fields represented,
delivered the Supreme Court's majority opinion affirming two of his own circuit court cases.").
215. Fisher, 6 U.S. at 400. It is significant that Justice Story, who also had a large
commercial case docket in his New England circuit courts, also differed with Marshall over the
issue of secret, or inchoate, liens. See HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 586 (discussing the
parallel between Washington's dissent in United States v. Fisher and Story's dissent in United
States v. 1960 Bags of Coffee).
216. See supra text accompanying notes 214-15.
217. Butler v. Hopper, 4 F. Cas. 904 (C.C.D. Pa. 1806) (No. 2241).




inapplicable in Butler's situation. 220 Nor was Butler a sojourner under
the statute by virtue of owning a summer house in Philadelphia, for
Butler also owned residences and plantations in South Carolina and
Georgia. 221 Although Justice Washington gave counsel wide latitude in
offering evidence tending to prove Butler's failure to alter his domicile
of origin-South Carolina-he nevertheless insisted that the plain
meaning of the Pennsylvania statute's exceptions required him to rule
in favor of Ben's emancipation. 22
2
A similarly close reading of the federal Fugitive Slave Act of
1793 led Justice Washington to reject an application for extradition
submitted to him while presiding in the Pennsylvania Circuit Court.
223
Here, because the slave voluntarily accompanied his master to
Pennsylvania and remained there for an extended period of time,
Washington held that he had become subject to the state
emancipation statute and was not subject to the federal Fugitive Slave
Act because he was not a fugitive from slavery when he entered
Pennsylvania.
224
Washington's willingness to consider legislative intent to
secure substantial justice is illustrated in Tryphenia v. Harrison,225 a
case in which two French women traveled through Philadelphia,
where they boarded a vessel for Havana. Two slaves accompanied
them, and when the ship returned to Philadelphia, it was sentenced
by the district court and condemned to be sold for violating federal
statutes prohibiting the use of American ships in the international
slave trade. On appeal, Washington reversed the sentence, reasoning
that Congress intended to prevent American citizens from engaging in
the international slave trade. Because the slaves were not transported
to Cuba for purposes of sale, the statute was not violated. 226
III. CIRCUIT COURT DUTIES
Prior to the elimination of Supreme Court circuit riding in
1892, most of a Supreme Court Justice's time was occupied by trying
cases and hearing appeals in his assigned circuit courts. As noted




223. Exparte Simmons, 22 F. Cas. 151 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 12,863).
224. Id. at 151-52.
225. 24 F. Cas. 252 (C.C.D. Pa. 1806) (No. 14,209).
226. Id. at 253.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 48-49..
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related to the cases heard en banc during the Court's yearly session.
Perhaps the best illustration of that connection is Corfield v.
Coryell,228  a case in which decision was reserved in Justice
Washington's Pennsylvania Circuit Court at the same time that
Gibbons v. Ogden was argued and decided in the Supreme Court.
229
From Justice William Johnson's dissent, we know that the Gibbons
Court spent some time debating whether the Commerce Clause
conferred exclusive powers upon the federal Congress. Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion for the Court recognized the extensive scope of
congressional regulatory power over interstate commerce, yet it
stopped short of declaring federal authority to be exclusive of any
state legislation in the area.230 Is it possible that Corfield, dealing with
property rights in the state of New Jersey, was in the mind of Justice
Washington or even, through him, in the minds of his colleagues like
John Marshall?
Corfield involved the arrest of Pennsylvania oystermen and
their vessel upon the charge that they were taking oysters from beds
off of Cape May in New Jersey.231 In accordance with a state statute,
the boat was sold at auction for the benefit of the State of New Jersey,
and the oystermen subsequently sued the state officials in the
Pennsylvania Circuit Court for trespass based on the seizure of their
boat and its equipment. In response to the fact that they were farming
New Jersey oyster beds, they claimed that the Commerce Clause
rendered unconstitutional New Jersey's restriction that its oyster beds
could be farmed only by residents of New Jersey.232 The case thus
brought before the circuit court the question of the degree to which the
Commerce Clause clashes with the traditional authority of a state to
control its natural resources, which was as much a matter of public
property rights as it was an aspect of state police powers. In
exonerating the New Jersey law enforcement officers in a judgment
given subsequent to the Gibbons opinion, Justice Washington
observed:
[T]he power which congress possesses to regulate commerce does not interfere with that
of a state to regulate its internal trade,... much less can that power impair the right of
228. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
229. 22 U.S (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
230. Compare id. at 227-29 (Johnson, J., concurring) (arguing for the exclusivity of
Congress's power to regulate commerce), with id. at 197-98, 203-06, 222 (Marshall, C.J.)
(arguing that the States also have power to regulate commerce within their respective
jurisdictions).
231. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 548.
232. Id. at 550.
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the state government to legislate, in such manner as in their wisdom may seem best,
over the public property of the state .... 233
Referring to the Privileges and Immunities Clause as it was
understood in the Articles of Confederation and in the Federal
Constitution, he acknowledged that the rights conferred upon
nonresidents of a state were extensive, but he insisted that this did
not require a state to extend particular benefits to nonresidents, such
as access to oyster beds, which are owned in common by all the
citizens of the state and cannot be enjoyed by others without express
statutory permission. 23 4 In addition, the power to regulate oyster beds
was vested in the State of New Jersey at the time the Federal
Constitution was ratified, and neither the Constitution nor any
subsequent federal legislation dealt with fisheries or oyster farming. 235
Therefore, the power to regulate remained with New Jersey.
236
Although Washington's brothers on the Supreme Court did not
have the benefit of his Corfield opinion when they considered Gibbons,
the very pendency of the case alerted them to the ramifications of
holding the Commerce Clause to be exclusive. Despite the substantial
alterations in federalism inherent in adopting the Constitution, the
states continued to exercise extensive powers derived as much from
their colonial backgrounds as from traditional understandings of
sovereignty. Those residual state powers might, as in Corfield, have
involved situations in which the state governments exercised certain
proprietary and management rights over natural resources that were
the common property of their inhabitants.
237
Few of Washington's other circuit court cases have had the
impact of Corfield, but the size and diversity of the dockets provided
him with a continuing opportunity to shape federal and international
law. Throughout his service-from the Quasi War with France to the
wars of revolution in South America-prize and marine insurance
cases were a steady component of his trial and appellate caseload.
Complicated issues of Pennsylvania and New Jersey land law passed
through his courts on their way to the Supreme Court. Admiralty
cases involved claims for seamen's wages, and the criminal business in
admiralty included a number of mutiny trials. It is in this multitude of
cases that Washington and his fellow Justices made their greatest
233. Id. at 550-51.
234. Id. at 552.
235. Id. at 553.
236. Id.
237. See generally HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE
CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730-1870, at 177-204 (1983)
(discussing the legal implications of local governments' ownership of private property).
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contribution to the advancement of federal justice in the young
republic. Buried in the Federal Cases thirty-volume set, there is ample
proof of the true greatness of a man known today primarily as John
Marshall's "twin."
IV. CONCLUSION
While Bushrod Washington was closely identified with Chief
Justice John Marshall, the two men nevertheless differed on
significant matters of law. In part, this difference was due to their
varied experiences in the circuit courts, but it also reflected varying
views of law and its relationship to society. Comparing the two, it
appears that Washington adapted more readily to changing
conditions, while Marshall's conservatism hardened to the point that
he ultimately found it difficult to synthesize the views of his
colleagues into unitary "opinions of the Court." Increasingly, that task
fell to Washington and Justice Joseph Story. In addition, the issuance
of two opinions in Green v. Biddle238 would suggest that as Chief
Justice, John Marshall in 1823 may have had periods of diminished
sensitivity to public opinion and the need to avoid unnecessary conflict
with the states and the other branches of the federal government. The
skill and diplomacy of Justice Washington may well have protected
the aging Chief Justice from many similar lapses.
Even this brief comparison of Justice Washington and Chief
Justice Marshall suggests that it is simplistic to analyze the Supreme
Court by way of political labels. So-called "Federalist" judges were not
inevitably pitted against their incoming "Republican" or "Jacksonian"
colleagues. Indeed, changes in Court decisions were probably as much
due to changing positions of individual Justices as they were due to
new appointments to the bench. One must exercise caution when
judging the relative effectiveness of a Supreme Court Justice. Men
who share Washington's temperament and commitment to the
collegial reputation of the Supreme Court tend to be dwarfed by their
more voluble or loquacious associates. In judicial history it is the
squeaky wheels who gain scholarly attention and are oiled with the
fame of academic concern. Supreme Court history ought to spend more
time with judicial biography, giving close attention to the varied roles
that each of the Justices played, both in the circuit courts and on the
bench of the high Court.
This brief and necessarily selective consideration of the
contributions of Justice Bushrod Washington suggests that although
238. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823).
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his preference for discouraging dissent in the Supreme Court has
obscured his role, he did much to enhance the work and reputation of
the Marshall Court. For most of his later years in judicial service,
Washington undertook the task of delivering, and probably preparing,
a number of the Supreme Court's opinions. In certain situations his
calm demeanor and skills as a negotiator and mediator proved
invaluable. Although he frequently agreed with or acquiesced in the
opinions of his close friend John Marshall, there were occasions when
the two Justices differed both strongly and publicly. Through
Washington's own extrajudicial efforts in recording and editing case
reports from his circuit courts, his contributions as a trial judge have
been well-preserved and deserve closer attention from the
constitutional history community.
More broadly, examining Washington's work provides a new
and revealing window on the last two decades of the Marshall Court.
As age began to make inroads on the Chief Justice's health,
Washington, along with Justice Story, assumed more significant
responsibilities in opinion writing and delivery. In addition,
disagreements over the legal foundations of economic development
consumed a growing part of the Court's discussion in conference. An
increasing number of Washington's differences from Marshall's
centered around three themes: (1) the tension between natural rights
to contract and the authority of government to regulate individual
initiative in contractual matters; (2) the degree to which secret
forfeitures and hidden liens should be permitted to burden commercial
activity and create instability and suspicion in credit arrangements;
and (3) the extent to which a Justice should defer to legislative intent
in the construction of statutes. Future study would profit from a
consideration of the degree to which the Justices' individual
experiences in the circuit courts shaped their personal perspectives as
well as their approach to constitutional jurisprudence. Finally,
historical study of the U.S. Supreme Court demands that scholars
take a more comprehensive approach to the Court as a whole and
understand each Justices as both an individual and also as a
productive contributor to the ongoing life and evolution of the high
Court.
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